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  Due to the land policy and historical reasons, most Chinese farmers are small-scale producers 
that lease a tiny plot of the collective land and do farming on their own. In the market economy, 
they have little bargaining power to negotiate with suppliers and buyers. Growing customer 
demands on product quality and variety are posing new requirements on farmers. Considering the 
gap between a competitive national market and the limited capability of Chinese farmers, the 
Chinese government has been promoting farmers cooperatives as a promising way to fuel 
agricultural development and improve farmers‟ quality of life. Cooperatives that are democratically 
set up and controlled by a group of farmers enable them to pool resources, reduce transaction costs, 
increase barging power in the market and achieve economies of scale. Furthermore, the collective 
power of cooperatives can integrate more profitable links of the value chain to satisfy sophisticated 
customer demands. Therefore, farmers are likely to receive benefits of lower costs and more 
income.  
  Comparing with the international principles, the Chinese farmers cooperatives differ from the 
international practices in multiple ways in order to suit the unique Chinese situation. The Chinese 
model demonstrates some flexibility in terms of membership, voting right and distribution of 
surplus to stimulate the initial development of cooperatives. Besides institutional variations, the 
co-existence of heterogeneous types of cooperative leadership is also noteworthy at the moment. It 
is found that leadership will, to a great extent, influence the efficiency and sustainability of a 
  
cooperative. While these forces in leadership have supported the emergence of cooperatives across 
China, farmers, who are supposed to be the leading forces and primary beneficiaries, are often 
deprived of decision making rights and find their interests secondary to those of the advantageous 
group.  
  With a hope to realize the fundamental values of cooperatives, which are “user-control, user-own 
and user-benefit”, this thesis studies different types of cooperative leadership and arrives at a 
three-stage approach as a progressive but systematic way to transform cooperatives. The three-stage 
approach starts with company-led cooperatives, to rural elites-led cooperatives as a transitional 
stage and finally approaches the last stage of farmers-led cooperatives. Proceeding from the first 
stage to the last, power and benefits for farmer members are supposed to be enhanced along with 
increasing demands on their capabilities to run a cooperative democratically. To complement rural 
elites‟ leadership in the transitional stage, the author suggests the employment of college-graduate 
rural officials who are well-educated and capable of bringing new resources and innovative 
solutions to strengthen cooperative development and serve the demands of farmer members.  
  Now that the cooperative is one form of organization and its management resembles that of a 
corporation, this thesis employs management tools and frameworks taught in the business school to 
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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION  
While the stunning growth of the Chinese economy has attracted worldwide attention, the 
laggard rural economy has been overlooked by many. For a long time, urbanization has been the 
priority of the nation while farmers and agriculture are secondary in importance. In the 60s and 70s, 
the People‟s Commune was the highest administrative body in rural areas that exercised absolute 
control over resources and labor. Production was done collectively and allocation of products was 
planned centrally, in favor of urban residents. Farmers, who were working hard all year long, found 
themselves sacrificed for that their productions were collected to feed cities, leaving less than 
enough for them to survive, while industrial products were sold to farmers at higher prices. 
Situation has improved after the People‟s Commune and the planned economy were abolished, but 
the income gap between rural and urban residents is widening. Higher income and employment 
opportunities have drawn millions of farmers into cities, which resulted in a severe brain drain and 
labor issue in the countryside. For most people, rural China stands for poverty and failure.   
Facing the rural issues, the central government has come to attach importance to the 
development of the rural economy and industrialization of agriculture by calling on the industrial 
sector to nurture agriculture. Yet, due to the land policy, most Chinese farmers are small-scale 
producers that lease a piece of collective land and do farming on their own. In the market economy, 
they have little bargaining power to negotiate with suppliers and buyers. Growing customer 
demands on product quality and variety add another layer of pressure on farmers. Considering the 
competitive national market and limited capability of Chinese farmers, there has been the 
consensus that establishing farmers cooperatives is a promising way to fuel agricultural 
development and improve farmers‟ quality of life. Cooperatives that are democratically set up and 
controlled by a group of farmers enable them to pool resources, reduce transaction costs, increase 
barging power in the market and achieve economies of scale. Furthermore, the collective power of 
cooperatives can integrate more profitable links of the value chain to satisfy sophisticated customer 
demands. Therefore, farmers are likely to receive benefits of lower costs and more income.  
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Born in a rural family and having spent the childhood in the countryside, the author is 
strongly attached to farmers and the rural life. After receiving education in a small city, a provincial 
capital city, the Chinese capital Beijing and later in one of the most developed cities in the world 
-Tokyo, the author has felt in person the striking contrast of living quality between advanced cities 
and impoverished rural villages. With the motive of finding out effective ways to improve farmers‟ 
livelihoods, the author sets out to research on the question and realized that Chinese specialized 
farmers cooperatives are promising instruments to realize the goal. Therefore, upon graduation 
from business school, the author would like to continue to study farmers cooperatives in 
China, which involve various industrial and business issues. It is expected that this thesis would 
help deepen the knowledge of cooperative mechanisms and work out a solution to solve the critical 
issues of the cooperative development.    
Due to time limitation and the complexity of gaining first hand data of small cooperatives 
that is enough to represent the situation of the whole country, this study is done using survey results 
of other scholars as well as extensive reference to relevant literatures. Business frameworks and 
tools will also be utilized to analyze management and structural issues of cooperatives.    
Since the concept of specialized farmers cooperatives was put forward only eight years ago 
in the year of 2007, the author assumes that the topic is new to many readers, therefore thorough 
explanation of cooperative mechanisms is one major part of the thesis. Following the first chapter 
of introduction, the second chapter is an introduction of the agricultural background in China, 
introducing agricultural conditions, history of rural development and current concerns. This chapter 
concludes with the point that agricultural cooperatives will improve the situation. Chapter two 
moves on to the topic of cooperatives in the world, and examines the history, basic values and 
fundamental mechanisms. A comparison between corporations and cooperatives is done using the 
Transaction-Cost Theory, the Principal-Agent Theory and the Stakeholder Theory, demonstrating 
the similarities and differences from other organizations, so as to assess roles of cooperatives and 
their governance.  
Chapter three discusses specialized farmers cooperatives in China, explaining the basic 
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principles that are different from the international ones, four development stages of cooperatives 
and analyzing the current situation in China. To study the driving force, the author uses the Five 
Forces Analysis to reveal the necessity of horizontal integration of farmers to increase scale and 
enhance bargaining power. Besides, value chains of the agricultural industry and a farmers‟ 
cooperative as well as the smiling curve of agriculture are introduced to illustrate the value of 
vertically integrated links of the chain. After that, achievements and problems are studied, giving an 
overview of cooperative development in China. It is found that there is a co-existence of several 
types of cooperatives that are led by initiators with various backgrounds, most of whom are not 
farmers. The leadership and management issue is discovered to be the key factor influencing 
efficiency and farmers‟ well-being in a cooperative. Therefore, the author reviews four most 
important types of cooperatives in China that are led by different initiators such as 
agriculture-related companies, NGOs and rural elites. Effectiveness and sustainability vary from 
type to type. 
While these forces in leadership have greatly boosted the emergence of cooperatives across 
China, farmers, who are supposed to be the leading force and primary beneficiaries, find their 
voices barely heard. In consistent with the fundamental values of cooperatives that are 
“user-control, user-own and user-benefit”, in chapter five, the author proposes a three-stage 
approach as a progressive but systematic way to transform cooperatives. It begins with a first stage 
that features the initiation of agricultural companies and transitions through the second stage of 
rural elites-led cooperatives. Finally it arrives at the ideal model of cooperatives controlled by 
farmers that reflects democracy, transparency and fairness in the last stage. Proceeding from the 
first stage to the last, power and benefits for farmer members are supposed to be enhanced along 
with increasing demands on their capabilities to run a cooperative democratically. Furthermore, 
special attention is given to the human resource issue in the transitional second stage. To 
complement the inherent deficiencies of rural elites, the author suggests using college graduate 
village officials who are educated and capable. Feasibility, problems and concerns of using those 
officials are elaborated in the middle part of chapter five. The last part wraps up with further 
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analysis of the three-staged proposal, explaining major objectives, key success factors and 
outcomes of each stage.   
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CHAPTER 2. DEVELOPMENT AND CONCERNS OF THE 
CHINESE AGRICULTURE AND THE RURAL ECONOMY 
Section 1. AGRICULTURAL CONDITIONS AND RESOURCES 
China has a vast territory of 960 million hectares stretching from tropics to cold-temperate 
zones. It descends from the west to the east, creating a three-step-staircase topography. On the first 
and the highest staircase, with an average high altitude of over 4,000 meters, lies the Tibetan 
Plateau known as the rooftop of the world. Mountains, plateaus and basins make up the second 
staircase running across the Midwest China. The third and the lowest staircase in the east is mostly 
constituted by hilly areas and plains. Major plains such as the Northeast China Plain, the North 
China Plain, the Middle-Lower Yangtze Plain and the Pearl River Delta Plain locate in this staircase 
and feature arable lands, fertile soil, good irrigation as well as large population, thus making it the 
most important and productive agricultural area in China. Such climate and topographical factors 
have brought about highly diversified natural conditions in different regions. While China has 
expansive land area, only 121.7 million hectares, in other words 12.8%, is arable land. Divided by 
the large national population of 1.36 billion, arable land per capita is below 0.09 hectare, only 45% 
of the world average of 0.2 (World Bank 2015a). It also means with only less than 8% of the world 
arable land, China has to feed about 19% of the world population.   
Section 2. HISTORY OF AGRICULTURAL AND RURAL DEVELOPMENT 
In the past decade, agriculture in China achieved rapid development. According to the 
National Bureau of Statistics of China (2013), Gross output value of agriculture reached 9,699.5 
billion Yuan in 2013, over three times of the output value in 2002. Agro-added value has also more 
than tripled, growing from 1,653.4 billion Yuan in 2002 to 5,696.6 billion Yuan in 2013. However, 
the percentage of Agro-added value to GDP has dropped from almost 13% to less than 10% in 2013, 
with years from 2002 to 2006 seeing the most drastic decline. Total grain yield has improved from 
457 million tons to 602 million tons, which has significant meaning in food security since a 
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decreasing amount of arable land has to feed an ever-increasing population in China. At the same 
time, grain yield per worker also enhanced from 1,419 kilograms in 2002 to 2,168 in ten years, 
indicating an improving productivity per worker.  
Such progress won't be achieved without the profound agricultural reform. In 1978, the 
Household Contract Responsibility System was put into use and in 1983 the People‟s Commune 
system was abolished. Before that, People‟s Commune was the highest administrative body that 
controlled resources and labor in rural areas. Land was collectively owned and all agricultural 
activities were centrally planned and assigned to members. Collective farming provided little 
incentive for farmers to work harder since everything was owned by the Commune and food 
produced was unevenly distributed by the government in favor of urban citizens. During those 
times, productivity was low and frustrated farmers were suffering from hunger and poverty. After 
the agricultural reform, although land is still owned by the public, it has granted rural households 
the right to contract some land and manage farming activities on their own, which re-ignited their 
individual intelligence as well as enthusiasm to improve productivity. In 1992, the agricultural 
reform was brought to a higher stage as the policy of State Monopoly of Purchasing and Marketing 
was terminated and a national food market came into being. Farmers were enabled to sell their 
products freely to the market under the market price. Since then, Chinese farmers start to make 
their production and marketing decisions individually. 
Section 3. CURRENT CONCERNS 
In spite of the good changes that have taken place, there are still a number of problems 
concerning agricultural and rural development to be dealt with.  
According to National Bureau of Statistics of China (2013), in 2013 the rural population 
was 0.63 billion, taking up 47% of the total population. As indicated in Exhibit 2.3, the rural 
population has been on a continuous decline and such trend is expected to carry on. At the same 
time, the percentage of labor participating in agriculture has decreased by 8.4 percent to 35.2% in 
2012. The percentage decline can be partly explained by the influence of rapid urbanization as well 
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as the income gap between urban and rural households. As can be seen in Exhibit 2.3, while urban 
residents on average have been earning 3 times of what rural residents are earning, what rural 
residents earned from agricultural activities to net income dropped from 45.8% to 34.4%, indicating 
that farmers have to turn to more non-farming work to sustain life. As more farmers are going to 
cities in search of higher income jobs as migrant workers, lands are left to be farmed by much 
fewer farmers, who are usually women and the elderly. Rural residents who have received higher 
education are also attracted to cities for better job opportunities and life quality. Agricultural 
efficiency and rural vitality therefore suffer all the more. If the situation continues, China will face 
a serious drain of young and educated workforce in the rural labor pool which will impair the 
sustainability and stability of the rural economy.    
Along with the quick urbanization that is taking place in suburban areas, the total size of 
farmland is shrinking. Under the condition that land and farming labor have been decreasing, in 
order to meet national food demands, it is crucial to increase productivity. However, according to 
World bank, in terms of agricultural productivity that is defined as agricultural value added per 
worker in constant 2005 U.S. dollars., despite the fact that China improved from $447 in 2000 to 
$785 in 2013, the latest result is still less than the East Asia & Pacific region (excluding high 
income economies) average of $822 and is far less than the world‟s average of $1,193 (World Bank 
2015b). On the other hand, Japan is a high number of $46,045 and U.S. $63,269. It is obvious to 
conclude that agriculture in China is still confronted with the problem of low productivity.  
To improve productivity and outputs, the Chinese government has been making strong 
policy and financial efforts to help industrialize agriculture. Nevertheless, agricultural 
industrialization remains at a low level where land is fragmented into tiny pieces that are leased by 
individual households who do farming in a small scale and with little mechanization. Most goods 
produced by these farmers are primary commodities with neither processing nor packaging. The 
central government has realized that one effective way to industrialize agriculture is to promote 
agricultural cooperatives. In 2006, the national law on specialized farmers cooperatives was 
enacted and came into effect in 2007. The introduction of the law and other related supportive 
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government policies have reflected policy makers‟ belief in the strategic role that cooperatives can 
play. As written in the very first article of the law, the objective of the law is to support and regulate 
the development of farmers cooperatives and facilitate the overall growth of agriculture and the 
rural economy (Xinhua News Agency 2006). It is widely acknowledged that cooperatives serve the 
purpose of poverty reduction and job creation by offering higher income and new job opportunities 
for the rural population. Besides, some cooperatives will facilitate regional community 
development as a result of coordinated planning and implementation. (ZHAO & Yuan 2014) 
Despite vigorous state support and the beneficial outcomes, this concept is still new to many 
Chinese people.    
To fully understand how cooperatives function, the next chapter will elaborate on the history, 
basic values and mechanisms of cooperatives. 
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CHAPTER 3. INTRODUCTION OF COOPERATIVES 
Section 1. HISTORY OF COOPERATIVES 
The concept of cooperatives has its source in Europe. During 1750 to 1850, while the 
Industrial Revolution had enhanced productivity tremendously, lower-class workers felt so 
exploited that they organized themselves against the suppression of capitalists, which was reflected 
in a wave of working-class movements. Witnessing the drawbacks of capitalism and the misery of 
deprived workers, Robert Owen and Charles Fourier proposed their idea of Utopia Socialism as a 
way to reform capitalism. According to their design, assets should be collectively owned, work 
collectively done, and members have equal rights. Putting forward these fundamental principles, 
they were regarded as pioneers of cooperatives.  
The Rochdale Society of Equitable Pioneers established in 1844 was recognized as the 
prototype of modern cooperatives. It was located in a town called Rochdale near Manchester and 
founded by 28 people, of whom more than half were workers in the textile industry. In 1840s, 
which was known as the “Hungry Forties”, workers were suffering from unemployment and low 
wages. Their poor livelihoods were further exacerbated by unethical retailers who sold food neither 
at a fair price nor with honest weights. Food adulteration was also not rare. The Rochdale Society 
of Equitable Pioneers were created in this context with the “idealism and vision of a better social 
order” (The Cooperative n.d.). The pioneers also formulated the well-known Rochdale Principles of 
Cooperation, whose influence has been significant till this day. Following the Rochdale Pioneers, 
the movement of cooperation sprang up in Europe and the rest of the world. The basic principles of 
Rochdale were adopted by the international society, updated later, and have been serving as 
guidelines for all cooperatives. 
The movement today has become more organized on a global scale. The International 
Cooperative Alliance (ICA) is an international non-governmental organization that unites and 
promotes cooperatives worldwide, covering various sectors such as agriculture, retailing and 
insurance. It was founded in 1895 by representatives of cooperatives from a number of countries. 
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At present, there are 284 member organizations from 94 countries on behalf of nearly 1 billion 
people (Cooperatives of the Americas 2015). It has been the most influential organization 
supporting the development of cooperatives in the world. 
Section 2. DEFINITION AND PRINCIPLES OF COOPERATIVES 
By definition from ICA, a co-operative is “an autonomous association of persons united 
voluntarily to meet their common economic, social, and cultural needs and aspirations through a 
jointly owned and democratically-controlled enterprise” (International Co-operatives Alliance n.d.).  
There are seven cooperative principles set by ICA to guide establishment and management 
of cooperatives. They are voluntary and open membership, democratic member control, member 
economic participation, autonomy and independence, education, training and information, and 
lastly, concern for community. Referring to the definition and principles above, key to cooperatives 
is that members can make voluntary decisions to join or leave a cooperative and that cooperatives 
are jointly managed in a democratic manner by members with equal voting rights (one person, one 
vote). 
Section 3. BASIC MECHANISMS AND COOPERATIVE GOVERNANCE 
Cooperatives, as one form of business organizations, share structural similarities with other 
organization forms like corporations, the kind that most people are familiar with. On the other hand, 
cooperatives have unique features in contrast with corporations. Wu Bin (2014) in his book 
Government Structure of Farmer Specialized Cooperatives Theoretic and Empirical Study 
employed an approach to study corporate governance theories as a reference for cooperatives. He 
referred to Mallin's (as cited in Wu 2014) view that the three theories that have the most significant 
influence on corporate management are the Transaction Costs Theory, the Principal-Agent Theory 
and the Stakeholder Theory.  
To study essential features and mechanisms of cooperatives, this thesis adopts Wu‟s 
approach to start with the case of corporations, observe similarities and distinctions, and try to 
 11 
come to the core of cooperative governance. 
3.3.1. The Transaction Costs Theory 
The Transaction Cost Theory developed by the Nobel Prize winner Ronald Coase defines 
transaction costs as costs that derive from market transactions such as search of appropriate 
partners, negotiation over contracts, contract enforcement and inspection (Watkins n.d.). Compared 
to costs paying for goods and services themselves, transaction costs are additional costs 
accompanying the market transaction process in order to acquire goods or services. It means when 
transactions take place in the marketplace instead of from within an organization, additional 
transaction costs are created. Because of the costs and inconveniences to do external market 
transactions, companies are formed to internalize such transactions and thus lower costs.  
Transaction costs are attributable to two driving factors. First of all, it is assumed that 
individuals and companies participate in transactions with bounded rationality, meaning that their 
personal and cognitive constraints limit them to make rational decisions. Secondly, individuals and 
firms are “self-interest seeking with guile” (Mikami 2011) and therefore behave opportunistically. 
They tend to manipulate information to serve personal interests.  
According to Williamson (1979, p. 239), three characteristics critical to transactions are 
transaction-specific investments, uncertainty and frequency of transactions. Transaction-specific 
investments are assets for specific use of certain transactions and have much less or no value if 
transferred to other transactions. Once invested, those assets become sunk costs that can hardly be 
retrieved. Investors will therefore face unfavorable situations if the other party takes advantage to 
renegotiate terms out of personal interests. In order to constrain the hazards of opportunism when 
assets specificity is high, transactions tend to be internalized and more formal governance 
structures are often created. 
Uncertainties of various kinds such as market demands, future trends and individual 
credibility will increase transaction costs since risks of uncertain happenings are taken into account 
and more efforts have to be made regarding contract enforcement.  
Frequency of transactions also influences transaction costs to a great degree. It is widely 
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held that the more frequent transactions are with a certain partner, the less uncertainties there will 
be since familiarity and previous transactions with the other partner help both sides to predict 
things such as behaviors, quality and price. In contrast to one-shot transactions where trust is low 
and short-term private gain prevails, in a repeated game individuals and firms are less likely to take 
opportunistic actions for the sake of future transactions and long-term gains. The threat of 
opportunism is therefore contained and mutual trust is cultivated. As a result, transaction costs are 
lowered because information search costs, negotiation costs as well as enforcement costs can be 
reduced. Weesen, Hobbs & Kerr (2014) also pointed out that high frequency allows the 
internalization of transaction-specific assets and that the mutual trust developed during transactions 
sets the base for more formal governance structures with closer coordination. 
In the case of agriculture, small-scale farmers face high transaction costs. Compared with 
large firms, they lack access to assets and markets. Due to the asymmetry in information and 
knowledge, they pay high costs to search for the appropriate trading partners and ensure their 
credibility. When a farmer finds or is reached by a buying company, he has little negotiation power 
to negotiate better terms and protect his personal interests. Costs also include time and money to 
monitor whether a contract is fulfilled as agreed.  
Moreover, farmers are subject to high market uncertainties. The nature of agriculture causes 
seasonal variation of most agricultural products in both production and consumption. Changes in 
weather, market demands, demographics and other factors aggravate the fluctuations in price. 
Small-scale farmers are very vulnerable to prices since their limited access to information and 
scarce market knowledge often lead to blindness or time lag in production that are out of step with 
price change. Moreover, short-term unstable transactions with different partners will also increase 
the level of uncertainty in market exchanges.  
As a result, short-term contracts are not satisfactory because of the high transaction costs 
and uncertainties farmers face. While Coase argued that a firm is a system of long-term contracts 
(Watkins n.d.), this view holds for cooperatives likewise. By forming a cooperative, farmers engage 
in long-term contracts to share risks and arrange production activities according to the 
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cooperative‟s direction. Meanwhile, the cooperative is obliged to provide services, oversee 
operation and negotiate with external parties. A cooperative allows farmers to internalize some 
transactions such as purchasing supplies, distribution and marketing. With larger scale, more 
bargaining power, better access to asset, information, technology and markets, it serves as an 
effective proxy to help farmers reduce costs and achieve scale economy. 
3.3.2. The Principal-Agent Theory 
The principal-agent theory, or often referred to as the principal-agent problem, is concerned 
with situations when a principal delegates his responsibility and entrusts an agent to finish a task. 
The agent is expected to serve the best interests of the principal. However, the agent‟s personal 
interests may not be consistent with the principal‟s goal. Therefore, driven by self interests, the 
agent is motivated to deviate from the principal‟s objectives and withhold information. Worse still, 
it is not easy for the principal to learn what really happened because of information asymmetry. In 
order to regulate the agent‟s behaviors and align interests, the principal has to devise and implement 
proper regulations, which will lead to agency costs.  
According to the most-cited scholars on this topic, Jensen and Meckling (1976) proposed 
that the principal can restrict the agent by creating incentive systems and monitoring the activities 
of the agent which will incur what they call “monitoring costs”. There are also bonding costs that 
agents spend to assure principals that they will commit to the interests of principals. Furthermore, 
losses are incurred when the agent‟s decisions diverge from decisions that will bring the best 
welfare to the principal, and such loss is termed as “residual loss”. Therefore, by their definition, 
agency costs include monitoring costs by the principal, bonding costs by the agent and the residual 
loss.  
To get the agent to accomplish the objective with efficiency and low costs, information 
transparency should be enhanced to reduce the information asymmetry problem while a binding 
contract and optimal regulation system should be created to minimize costs (Wu 2014).  
For cooperatives, it is not economically effective or possible for the General Assembly of 
members to make every decision and supervise the implementation. It is necessary to bring in 
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management to manage daily operation and make decisions on behalf of members. When this 
happens, the “separation of ownership and control” issue takes place and becomes a source of the 
principal-agency problem. 
Yet, the principal-agent relationship is even more pronounced in cooperatives. In 
corporations the management acts as the agent for investors, while in cooperatives a two-way 
principal-agent relationship exists. Sigismundo, Marcelo & Amaury (n.d.) illustrates the 
relationship in the figure below.  
 
Figure 3.3.2 Source: Sigismundo, Marcelo & Amaury (n.d.) 
The general assembly, which is constituted and controlled by members, delegates 
management responsibilities as the principal to managers. On the other hand, in actual operation 
such as production of milk, managers serve as the principal with a collective target and assign the 
production tasks to individual members. In this case, members become agents who are obliged to 
fulfill the principal‟s goal. Because of the two-way attribute, the principal-agent relationship is 
more sophisticated in cooperatives. 
The principal-agent relationship gives rise to agency costs because interests of the principal 
and those of the agent are not consistent, and sometimes in conflict with each other. Agents may act 
in their personal interests at the expense of principal’s benefits. Such problem is further 
complicated when external managers are not allowed the right to own shares since cooperatives are, 
 15 
by definition, owned by members (Hailu et al. n.d.). Therefore, effective incentive systems, control 
systems as well as transparency should be in place to reduce agency costs. 
In addition, Sigismundo, Marcelo & Amaury (n.d.) argued that the degree of risk aversion 
of agents and principals should be taken into account when designing such systems so as to balance 
interests. If the agent is risk neutral, he might be motivated by incentives based on equity, which 
will enhance efficiency and help to align his interests with the principal‟s. If not, fixed 
remuneration might be preferred. In principal‟s case, if the principal is risk neutral, he might risk 
more expecting better returns on equity. When he is risk-aversive, immediate benefits such as 
cheaper prices of supplies might be more appropriate. After all, design of incentive systems needs 
to consider agents‟ and principals‟ stances towards risk.  
In agricultural cooperatives, particularly when members are not fully informed or educated 
to monitor the management‟s conducts and performances, importance should be attached to 
improve information transparency and establish a sound control system such as hiring accountants, 
auditors and setting up a board of supervisors.  
3.3.3. The Stakeholder Theory 
The concept of stakeholders was introduced into corporate management by R. Edward. 
Freeman. He (1993, p. 41) argued against the traditional shareholder viewpoint that shareholders 
own the company and therefore the objective of the management is to maximize value for 
shareholders. His stakeholder concept defines stakeholders as “groups and individuals who benefit 
from or are harmed by, and whose rights are violated or respected by, corporate actions”. In other 
words, stakeholders have a stake in the activities and performance of a company and will in turn 
affect its existence. Freeman and Reed (1983, p. 42) also divided definition of stakeholders into a 
narrow and a wide one. The narrow one is concerned with groups who have critical roles in a 
corporation‟s existence and success. The figure below is a model of a large corporation‟s 
stakeholders given by Freeman in a narrow sense. The wide one is enlarged to any group who has 
an influence or is influenced by corporate activities. 
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Figure 3.3.3 Source: Freeman and Reed (1983) 
Therefore, stakeholders cover a wide range of parties from shareholders, employees, 
customers to the local community and political groups, whose interests are different and sometimes 
conflicting. Under the guidance of this theory, management is responsible to serve and balance out 
the various needs of all stakeholders. Besides the monetary return that shareholders demand, 
management should care for claims such as employees‟ demand for higher wage and customers‟ 
demand for better quality. Handling power struggle and giving considerations to divergent interests 
among stakeholders for the sake of common benefits is therefore a key role of management.   
In principal, cooperatives are designed to have only one category of members, that is, 
farmers make the single category of membership of farmers‟ cooperatives. To serve the demands of 
farmers is the fundamental reason why a farmers‟ cooperative exists, thus granting farmers status as 
the pivotal stakeholders. Tirole (2001, p. 24) divided stakeholders in organizations into two groups. 
“Natural stakeholders” are the ones who are intrinsically related to an organization such as 
customers and suppliers, while “stakeholder by design” refers to stakeholders as a result of the 
organizational structure such as shareholders. In the case of farmers‟ cooperatives, farmers are users 
and shareholders at the same time. With respect to ownership, they are “stakeholders by design”. 
Meanwhile, they are “natural stakeholders” by right of their user properties, utilizing cooperative 
services.  
Nowadays, there is a trend of a broadening membership to include heterogenous members 
into the conventional single-category member group. Cooperatives having two or more types of 
member categories are called multi-stakeholder cooperatives, meaning that control power is likely 
to be transferred from a single member group to be re-distributed among multiple interest groups. 
The heterogenous stakeholdership will create a larger pool of resources and by resorting to the 
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collective intelligence coming from groups with diverse backgrounds and viewpoints, a cooperative 
can thus strengthen its value creation.    
Nevertheless, it also raises the difficulty to govern multiple controlling stakeholders in a 
single entity. One group of stakeholders may gradually prevail over others and dominate an 
organization to steer strategies towards their best interests at the cost of other groups. A group with 
the strongest voice or the manager category is likely to be the dominator. (Lindsay & Hems, 2004) 
In addition, costs of engaging different constituent actors in decision making are high. 
Whereas cooperatives are designed to internalize market transactions to lower costs and enhance 
efficiency, slower decision making process and high costs of participation will in turn push up 
internal costs in multi-stakeholder cooperatives. Two reasons cause inefficiencies of management. 
To start with, different interests groups have the same inclination to prioritize their own benefits, 
rather than aiming for the well-being of the cooperative as a whole. Costs are boosted when the 
cooperative‟s overall interests are not maximized. Secondly, the process to understand the 
preferences and standpoints of other stakeholders, and arrive at a consensus through 
communication is also cost-adding to make a decision (Leviten-Reid & Fairbairn 2011). 
After all, to resolve conflicts and direct multiple stakeholders towards a common goal is no 
easy task. Special governing mechanism is necessary to maximize benefits of a multi-stakeholder 
cooperative. 
Section 4. THE LEGAL STRUCTURE OF COOPERATIVES 
The legal structure of all business organizations, whether a for-profit corporation or a 
non-profit organization, defines ownership, control as well as distribution of surplus. (UWCC 2015 ) 
A cooperative, as a business organization, has its own distinct legal structure.  
In a firm, investors who hold shares, or what we call “shareholders”, possess the ownership 
and the number of shares decides the decision making power each shareholder has. When there is a 
surplus of profit, it is returned to shareholders according to the number of shares they hold. A 
cooperative, on the other hand, is owned by its members, therefore the ownership of a farmers‟ 
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cooperative belongs to all farmer members. It is democratically controlled by members who have 
equal basic voting rights (one person, one vote) regardless of the number of shares. Decisions are 
jointly made while surplus is distributed in proportion to each member‟s patronage.    
Table 3.4 (a) further identifies differences among cooperatives, corporations and nonprofit 
organizations in detail.  
Table 3.4 (a) Comparison of Co-ops, Corporations and NGOs 
 Cooperatives Corporations NGOs 
Purpose 
Meet members‟ needs; 
profits from the market; 
other social welfare 
Profit maximization from market; 




Ownership Members Shareholders Nobody 
Governance 
General assembly and 
Board of directors elected 
by members; managers 
Shareholder meeting and board of 
directors elected by shareholders as 




One person, one vote (in 
theory); Democratic 
control by all members 
In proportion to capital investment / 
Entry/exit 






Shares to members; 
retained profits 






Members in proportion to 
their patronage 





Source: UWCC (2015), Smith (n.d.) 
 While the above table mainly addresses differences among organizations, it is notable that 
cooperatives, at the core, resemble the internal structure of corporations. Table 3.4 (b) illustrates the 
basic structures of cooperatives and corporations. Members who are entitled to rights of ownership, 
voting and obtaining profits, are counterparts to shareholders enjoying similar rights in corporations. 
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They act as the principal and delegate the day-to-day operation to the management with the hope 
that the management can serve their best interests. In reverse order, the management act as the 
agent and assume the responsibility of reconciling divergent interests among different constituents 
of the larger principal group. Staffs in both organizations take the same role of performing tasks 









Source: Created by the author  
 In all, the basic mechanisms such as transaction costs and the principal-agent relationship 
as well as the internal structure of a cooperative are more or less identical to that of a corporation, 
which implies that cooperatives could draw on experiences of corporations as references to deal 
with various issues. 
Section 5. BENEFITS OF COOPERATIVES IN AGRICULTURE   
By collaborating in cooperatives, famers bring themselves together to increase overall 
competitiveness in the market. In most cases, especially in developing countries, farmers do not 
have much access to market information, advanced technology or capital. Therefore, they can 
hardly differentiate their products and are usually very vulnerable against market changes. 
Moreover, they have poor bargaining power both when buying supplies and selling products, which 
often result in higher prices of supplies but smaller profits for farmers.  
Agricultural cooperatives help farmers to pool fragmented resources together to achieve 
Table 3.4 (b) Internal Structure of Co-ops and Corporations 
 Co-ops Corporations 




The Agent Management Management 
Staff Staff Staff 
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scale economies. In this way, their bargaining power is enhanced and transaction costs are lowered 
as mentioned in the earlier chapter. With more market information, technical assistance, capital and 
marketing capabilities, cooperatives are able to introduce new products according to customer 
demands and build brands. Since a cooperative is managed democratically by all members, farmers 
also gain a channel to express their interest demands and make their voices heard.  
Ortmann and King (2007) give an all-encompassing summary of the main reasons of 
formation of agricultural cooperatives. They are: poverty reduction, redressing market failure as a 
result of high information costs and transaction costs, promotion of self-help, wish for income 
increase, reduction of transaction costs with traders, improvement of bargaining power, assuring 
stable supplies and/or markets for products, good coordination of supply chain, support of 
government, strength of leadership, motivation and enthusiasm for cooperatives, community 
development, achieving scale economies and lastly reducing opportunistic behavior.   
Moreover, the UN Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) highly recognizes the 
importance of cooperatives in rural development and sustainable employment. According to FAO 
(2012, p. 1), cooperatives “empower their members economically, socially and create sustainable 
rural employment through business models that are resilient to economic and environmental 
shocks”. By joining and organizing cooperatives, farmers are also able to fully exercise decision 
making rights and claim for larger rights such as land rights, which is otherwise impossible to 
achieve by an individual farmer.  
Because of the various benefits small-scale and marginalized farmers can enjoy as well as 
the significance to the society, agricultural cooperatives have found wide application in the world. 
According to the 2013 World Cooperative Monitor (ICA 2013, p. 17), cooperatives take about 32% 
of the world market share in agriculture and food industries. The largest cooperative by turnover in 
the sector in 2011 was Zen-Noh in Japan achieving a turnover of 62.44 billion USD. The largest 
cooperative in the sector by turnover on GDP per capita was Indian Farmers Fertilizer Cooperative 
Ltd.. Such gigantic cooperatives have exerted significant influence on a national and even global 
scale. However, there is no functioning cooperative in China at present that can be mentioned in the 
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same breath. It was not until 2007 that farmers cooperatives in China for the first time obtained 
legal status and since then started to rapidly develop across the country. Yet, a number of unique 
features and challenges emerged along the way. 
Section 6. PROBLEMS AND CONCERNS   
Scholars argued that while cooperatives provide a number of benefits, they also have some 
inherent risks. Common problems include the horizon problem that members tend to focus on 
short-term investments since they can‟t benefit from a cooperative once their membership 
terminated; the monitoring problem that decision making is controlled by professional managers 
who are not necessarily members and therefore have to be supervised; the influence cost problem 
that different interest subgroups are likely to engage in expensive lobbying activities so as to 
influence decision making; as well as the decision problem that it is difficult and costly for a large 
or heterogeneous membership to negotiate towards a consensus (Valentinov 2007). The table below 
gives a good summary of common inherent risks of conventional cooperatives.  
Inherent weaknesses of conventional cooperatives 
Inherent Weakness  Comments 
Free-rider 
(common 
property) problem  
Conventional cooperatives usually have a large amount of collective capital (common 
property) derived mainly from retained earnings accumulated over time. Initial membership 
fees (equity shares) at the establishment of a cooperative will likely be the same for all 
members, and these equity shares (property rights) are usually not tradable. However, since 
rights to residual claims (net profit) are linked to patronage instead of investment, new 
members joining later receive the same benefits as existing members although they are not 
required to make initial investments proportionate to their use of the cooperative; i.e. new 
members get immediate access to all the assets of the cooperative.  
Horizon problem  
The benefits members receive from their investments in the cooperative are limited to the 
time period over which they expect to patronize the cooperative. As young and older 
members have different planning horizons, the cooperative will not make the best 
investments; e.g. it will tend to under-invest in assets with long-term payoffs, and managers 
and directors will be under pressure to increase equity redemptions at the expense of 
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Inherent weaknesses of conventional cooperatives 
retained earnings (which could have been used to invest in additional assets).  
Portfolio problem  
Equity shares in a conventional cooperative cannot generally be freely traded so that 
members are unable to diversify their individual investment portfolios according to their 
personal wealth and risk preferences. It is, therefore, impossible for cooperative managers 
and directors to make investments in the interests of all members.  
Control problem  
A divergence of interests between cooperative members (principals) and managers (agents) 
gives rise to control problems. The challenge is to establish incentive mechanisms for 
managers that will align their interests with those of the members. This may not be a major 
problem in small cooperatives with a relatively homogeneous membership (in terms of 
members‟ interests) and focused (specialized) activities (e.g. sale of vegetables), which may 
apply to the case study example.  
Influence cost 
problem  
This problem can arise in a cooperative with a wide range of activities and thus diverse 
objectives of its members. Members may try to influence managers‟ decisions, which could 
result in costly misallocations of resources. This problem may not apply to the case study 
farmers whose objectives and interests may not be very diverse, at least initially .  
 
Source: Ortmann & King (2007) 
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CHAPTER 4. OVERVIEW OF SPECIALIZED FARMERS 
COOPERATIVES IN CHINA 
Witnessing the benefits of cooperation in agriculture, the public and the private sectors in 
China have been encouraging and involved in the creation of agricultural cooperatives. Similar to 
cooperatives around the world, the core of agricultural cooperatives in China is in line with the 
basic principles, mechanism and governance structure defined by International Association of 
Cooperatives. Yet, factors including the land policy, agricultural history, political environment as 
well as notable regional disparities in China aggregate to form a special type of agricultural 
cooperatives with strong Chinese characteristics. The Chinese government officially termed it as 
specialized farmers cooperative. 
Section 1. DEFINITION AND BASIC PRINCIPLES 
In 2007, the Law of the People's Republic of China on Specialized Farmers Cooperatives 
was adopted, finally granting Chinese agricultural cooperatives legal recognition. According to the 
law (Xinhua News Agency 2006), specialized farmers cooperatives are established on the basis of 
the Household Contract Responsibility System, which allows farmers to contract a piece of 
collectively-owned land and manage on their own. This feature derives from the unique Chinese 
situation and is different from the international practice. The word “specialized” means that the 
organization is constituted by members dealing with the same type of agricultural products or 
services. Farmers cooperatives serve the needs of members by providing services such as collective 
purchase of supplies, sales and marketing of products, processing, transportation and storage as 
well as technical assistance and market information.  
Consistent with ICA, the Chinese law regulates that cooperatives should be voluntarily 
established and democratically controlled by members. There are also five basic principles to be 
observed.  
Firstly, the majority of members should be farmers. Secondly, the purpose is to serve 
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members well and strive for the common interests of all members. Thirdly, members have the right 
to join and leave a cooperative in accordance with their own will. Fourthly, members are equal and 
cooperatives should be managed in a democratic manner. Fifthly, surplus should be mainly 
distributed proportionally to members‟ volume (amount) of transactions with cooperatives (Xinhua 
News Agency 2006). 
Companies and organizations, which are engaged in agricultural production and 
management activities directly related to what a cooperative does, are allowed to join the 
cooperative but it is required that farmer members should take up at least 80% of the total 
membership. For cooperatives with less than 20 members, one company/organization is allowed to 
join. Cooperatives with more than 20 members can take no more than 5 percent of company or 
organization members.   
A cooperative should establish the general assembly and elect a chairman who is the legal 
representative of the cooperative. The general assembly consists of all members and executes the 
governing power over the cooperative. Its rights and responsibilities include election and removal 
of board members, resolution on major issues, approval of annual reports, distribution of surplus, 
decisions on employment of managers and others. If necessary, the general assembly can elect its 
board of directors, executive supervisor and board of supervisors. For cooperatives with more than 
150 members, representative assembly can be arranged to execute partial or full function of the 
general assembly.  
Each member of farmers cooperatives has equal basic voting right of one person one vote, 
protecting the basic right and interests of each individual member. On top of that, it is also allowed 
to distribute additional voting right to members with large contributions (either in terms of 
transaction volume or capital investment). Yet, the total number of additional votes is restricted to 
be less than 20 percent of total basic votes by all members. Members can also exercise rights to 
attend membership meetings, utilize all services provided as well as the right to supervise the 
board.  
Regarding the distribution of surplus, the law displays some flexibility. Although in 
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principal, surplus should be distributed proportionally to transaction volume (amount), it permits 
distribution of additional surplus according to members‟ capital contributions and shares of 
common reserve funds as long as no less than 60% of total surplus has been distributed based on 
the first rule.  
As indicated above, the Chinese law on specialized farmers cooperatives modifies the 
classic cooperative principles and tolerates more diversity in terms of membership, voting rights 
and distribution of surplus. An explicit comparison between the classic model and the Chinese 
model is made in table 4.1. The introduction of non-farmer members is expected to strengthen ties 
between farmers and other market players so as to accelerate the integration of agribusiness supply 
chains. 
Table 4.1 Comparison of the Classic Co-op Model and the Chinese Model 
 Classic Cooperative Model 
Chinese Specialized Farmers 
Cooperatives 
Purpose 
Meet members‟ needs; profits 
from the market; other social 
welfare 
Meet members‟ needs; profits 
from the market; rural 
development; Increase job 
opportunities 
Ownership A single category of members 
Farmer members as well as 
members of other categories 
Governance 
General assembly and Board of 
directors elected by members; 
managers 
General assembly and director. 
(Board of directors, executive 
supervisor, board of supervisors 
if necessary) 
Voting rights 
One person, one vote (in theory); 
Democratic control by all 
members 
One person one vote, plus 
additional voting right to 
members with large transaction 
volume or capital contributions 
Entry/exit One share/fee for a membership One share/fee for a membership 
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Table 4.1 Comparison of the Classic Co-op Model and the Chinese Model 
Financing 
Shares to members; retained 
profits 
Shares to members; retained 
profits; government subsidies 
Distribution of surplus 
In proportion to members‟ 
patronage 
At least 60% of surplus should 
be distributed in proportion to 
transaction volume; the rest 
could be distributed according to 
capital contributions 
Source: Created by the author  
Section 2. DEVELOPMENT OF SPECIALIZED FARMERS COOPERATIVES IN CHINA 
The emergence of agricultural cooperatives in China can be traced back to even before the 
founding of People‟s Republic of China in 1949. Due to distinct historical, economic and political 
features in different periods, the development path can be categorized into four stages. 
4.2.1. Four Development Stages 
Before the founding of P.R. China, the National Government ruled by the Kuo Min Tang 
(KMT) party had made attempts to promote agricultural cooperatives. However, without 
restructuring the land and local governing systems, KMT‟s top-down attempts could not raise much 
incentive among farmers. On the other hand, the Communist Party of China (CPC)‟s bottom up 
approach received active response and participation from farmers. Through land reform, the feudal 
land ownership and the oppression of landlords on poor farmers were removed. The successful 
policy therefore won huge support from the grassroots for CPC (Garnevska, Liu & Shadbolt 2011, 
p. 71). 
The second stage is featured with ups and downs. After the establishment of P.R. China in 
1949, an earth-shaking nationwide revolution in land system took place in rural areas. Under the 
new land policy, poor Chinese farmers obtained the ownership right of land. The pervious loosely 
controlled rural areas were also placed under the governance of basic level government. Thanks to 
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highly motivated farmers as well as government support to integrate resources, productivity was 
improved greatly. However, such progress was snuffed out when the Chinese government rushed to 
urge the set-up of highly collective cooperatives on a national scale. The rash and top-down 
government decision was pushed forward regardless of farmers‟ wills, the level of productivity or 
other objective factors. Under the political pressure, farmers had to join the People‟s Commune 
which took absolute control over land, labor, resources and exercised the highest power in the rural 
areas. Farmers were deprived of the ownership of land, as well as the freedom and rights to manage 
production, surplus and use of labor. Although the People‟s Commune was intended to reflect the 
cooperation spirit, it ran counter to every aspect of basic principles and purpose of cooperatives. It 
went against ICA‟s core ideas of democratic control and member rights. As a consequence, farmers 
became de-motivated the outcome was disastrous. Productivity dropped drastically and agricultural 
development stagnated (Wang 2010). 
Learning from the expensive lessons in the last stage, starting from 1980, the Chinese 
government refocused on agricultural and rural development, and showed vigorous support to 
stimulate farmers‟ enthusiasm. People‟s Commune and collective production was replaced by 
Household Contract Responsibility System and farmers started to make their own farming 
decisions. At the same time, State Monopoly of Purchasing and Marketing of agricultural products 
was abolished and changed to a market economy allowing farmers to directly participate in the 
market. Most farmers began to sell products to customers on farmers market or to small traders and 
wholesalers. While farmers were highly motivated by the new policies to work individually in the 
first few years, as market economy advanced, small-scale farmers started to feel pressured by the 
intensifying market competition and demanding customers. With so scarce resources and so little 
strength, individual farmers were unable to keep up with the market changes that they again 
resorted to cooperatives. Due to a lack of official recognition and guidance, those grassroots 
cooperatives came into existence in different forms, usually strongly influenced by the initiators. 
Although development of cooperatives at this stage started to take off, they were not yet regulated. 
The latest stage began with the promulgation of the Law of the People's Republic of China 
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on Specialized Farmers Cooperatives in 2006 when the development of cooperatives finally came 
back to a regulated fast track with strong institutional backing. The central government has iterated 
the role of cooperatives as a critical instrument to fuel rural development. Farmers cooperatives can 
now register with Administrative Bureau for Industry and Commerce and obtain legal status. Hence, 
farmers cooperatives started to spring up nationwide. Note that farmers specialized cooperatives are 
by no means equivalent to cooperatives that were prevalent in the 1960s and 1970s featuring 
collective farming and undifferentiated distribution of products. Whereas those cooperatives were 
out of sync with the economic reality, farmers specialized cooperatives are the product of highly 
specialized division of labor as well as the market-oriented economy (Chai & Ye 2006). 
Throughout the four development stages of cooperatives in China, government has played a 
significantly important role. However, such role is double edged. While government support can 
help to create an enabling environment that nurtures the growth of cooperatives, too much 
top-down government intervention is not in line with the democratic nature of cooperatives and will 
therefore dampen farmers‟ enthusiasm. 
4.2.2. Current Situation: Driving Forces, Achievements and Problems 
4.2.2.1. Driving Forces for Cooperatives 
While the central government has explicitly stated the significance of cooperatives in rural 
development and farmers‟ livelihood improvement, this chapter will look into the driving forces of 
farmers cooperatives from a business perspective. Five forces analysis is utilized to analyze small 
scale farmers‟ market position against other players and therefore explain the necessity of 
horizontal integration of farmers to gain competitiveness. Furthermore, the value chain analysis is 
employed to show how cooperatives contribute to the vertical integration of the value chain and 
thus lead to value creation for customers, farmers, and the industry as a whole.  
Horizontal Integration of Farmers 
Market changes that are taking place in the agricultural product market challenge the ability 
and adaptability of small-scale farmers and provide impetus for them to change. The five forces 
analysis gives a clear illustration of small-scale farmers‟ position in the market.  
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Buyers‟ Bargaining Power 
Buyers here refer to both end consumers as well as trading partners who buy from farmers. 
Consumers nowadays are becoming more sophisticated. They demand wider choices of products, 
better availability and accessibility as well as higher product quality (Bijman & Hu 2011, p. 1). 
Restricted by a limited number of products, the perishable and seasonal nature of fresh products, 
poor transportation and storage, individual small-scale farmers face difficulties to keep pace with 
customer expectations. Moreover, the outbreak of food scandals has raised Chinese customers‟ 
awareness of food safety. A decreasing level of trust on food quality has put farmers in an 
unfavorable position since their ability to preserve and track quality of fresh produce is lower than 
large companies. Differences of unprocessed agricultural products among competitors are minor. 
Hence, the switching cost is low for consumers since plenty of similar choices exist both in farmers 
market and in supermarkets. Trading partners including traders, wholesalers and retailers have 
larger bargaining power than farmers and can switch to other farmers easily. As supermarkets 
mushroom in Chinese cities, they become major food outlets for urban residents and have large 
transaction volumes. For this reason, supermarkets possess large bargaining power when 
negotiating with suppliers. Compared with larger suppliers like agricultural companies, it is 
difficult for small-scale farmers to fulfill large orders or to comply with the stricter quality 
requirements imposed by supermarkets (Bijman & Hu 2011, p. 1). Therefore, small-scale farmers 
are weak in power when dealing with buyers. 
Suppliers‟ Bargaining Power 
Suppliers are providers of production supplies such as fertilizers, seeds and pesticides. Most 
of the supplies are produced by companies and sold through retailers. Since individual famers buy 
in very small quantity, there is little space of negotiation. Suppliers are price setters who leave not 
much bargaining power on farmers‟ hands. 
Competitors 
Small-scale farmers are likely to find themselves competing with competitors of various 
kinds. They have to compete with large-scale farming households, farms and other producers so as 
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to sell to players in the next link of the supply chain. Meanwhile, they also compete with retailers to 
sell to consumers. A large number of players are flooding the market with products of little 
differentiation. Worse still, competitors of larger scale have better access to capital, market 
information, technology as well as other resources that help them improve product varieties, quality 
and marketing activities. Thus, farmers are often overtook by large-scale competitors and find it 
hard to keep a firm foothold in the rivalry.  
Threat of New Entrants and Substitutes 
Barriers to entry are extremely low in China because initial investment is low. Anyone who 
contracts a plot of farm land can start farming. Substitutes are not common in this industry now that 
people have to live on fresh agricultural products.  
All in all, according to the five forces analysis, small-scale farmers have very weak position 
in the market and are vulnerable against market changes. The situation is therefore driving farmers 
to form organizations with collective capabilities to meet customer demands and compete in the 
evolving value chain. Together with reasons of high transaction costs and market uncertainties 
mentioned previously, horizontal integration with other farmers into a farmers cooperative is an 
effective tool to share risks and achieve scale. 
Vertical Integration of Value Chains 
While the horizontal integration aspect looks at the unification of isolated households to 
enhance bargaining power and reduce costs, the vertical integration of value chain aspect focuses 
on how value and profits are created by cooperatives. The two types of integrations work out the 
ultimate formula of benefits for farmers, which is costs down and profits up.   
The value chain is a chain of sequential activities that start from production and link 
together to deliver value to end consumers. In agriculture, Miller and Jones (2010) regarded it as 
the “farm to fork set of processes and flows”. 
In Figure 4.2.2.1 (a), the author puts together a value chain of the agricultural industry. This 
chain starts from production supplies and flows through production, transportation/storage, 
processing, sales and marketing and finally ends up on consumers‟ table. Participants carrying out 
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these activities include suppliers, farmers, traders, processors, wholesalers and retailers, yet some 
participants are able to play several roles in a coordinated manner. For example, large agricultural 
companies may lease some land, do farming and marketing on their own. Apart from primary 
activities, supportive activities such as R&D, financing, information, business services, 
infrastructure and government support are instrumental to smooth out the whole process. Instead of 
considering these activities as cost drivers, the value chain perspective views them as steps that add 
incremental value to the finished product or service. (HBS n.d.). In each step, value can be made 
through either simple transportation of the product from point A to point B or complex product 
enhancement such as processing and packaging (Miller & Jones 2010, p. 9).  
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Source: created by the author 
The vertical integration of upstream and downstream links of the value chain can bring 
benefits of efficiency improvement, freshness preservation and quality traceability which are 
critical competitive advantages when customer demands and sophistication are ever-increasing. 
Furthermore, it can reduce wastes and lower consumer prices. Value-chain integration is also 
recognized by the Chinese government as a method to industrialize the overall agricultural industry. 
It provides a source of competitive advantage in export when Chinese firms have to compete with 
highly integrated and professional international players.  
In contrast with the overall value chain, in most cases, farmers only participate in the 
Consumers 
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production link and are squeezed between forward suppliers and backward traders. A smiling curve 
of the agricultural industry can further illustrate their deplorable situation. According to the curve in 
figure 4.2.2.1.(b), whereas activities like processing, marketing and sales are standing at the upper 
edges of the curve, production falls to the bottom of the curve adding the least value to products. 
Because of the intense competition mentioned previously, farmers have not yet enjoyed fruits of the 
upgrading value chain, but are rather deprived of profits.  
Source: Adapted from Fan (2014, p. 398) 
 
In order to turn things around, farmers have to perform other activities closer to the two 
profitable ends, now that they can‟t move away from production work. By forming cooperatives, 
such goal becomes viable. The cooperative role fits in well with the objective of vertical 
coordination. A cooperative‟s value chain usually occupies a part of the overall agricultural chain 
that is preceded by upstream suppliers and/or followed by downstream distributors. In figure 
4.2.2.1 (c), the author illustrated the value chain of a cooperative. While the actual farming work is 
assigned to and done by farmer members, supporting activities such as planning, quality control, 
technical assistance, and HR management are performed collectively by cooperatives that have 
more capabilities and resources than individuals. Supplies are purchased together and marketing is 
unified at the cooperative level. By eliminating intermediaries and incorporating higher value 
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Figure 4.2.2.1 (b) Smiling Curve of the Agricultural Industry 
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activities such as processing and marketing, cooperatives help farmers to climb up the value chain 
towards higher profitability. In the meantime, customers can benefit from lower prices, higher 
product quality and varieties, as well as brand credibility.  
Figure 4.2.2.1 (c) Value Chain of A Cooperative 
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Source: created by the author 
Although a cooperative may not perform all the activities mentioned above at the moment, 
cooperatives do help vertically integrate some parts of the value chain. Moreover, since the Chinese 
law allows for non-farmer membership in cooperatives, farmers, traders, processors, wholesalers 
and retailers engaging in the same business entity can join hands and construct a value chain at a 
much integrated level. After all, “a chain is only as strong as its weakest link” (Miller & Jones 2010, 
p. 9), cooperatives‟ ability to strengthen the production link and create synergy with other links or 
participants will have significant meaning to agricultural industrialization in China as a whole.     
4.2.2.2. Current Achievements 
With years of development, farmers cooperatives in China have increased in number, 
improved in operational quality and enlarged in scale. By the end of March 2013, more than 
730,000 farmers cooperatives have been registered, involving 54 million or one fifth of total 
households in rural China. Every month, around 10,000 cooperatives are newly created (Zhang 




grew six-fold over the five years and totaled 689,000 as of the end of 2012. During the same period, 
share capital surged by twelve times from 0.09 in 2008 to 1.1 trillion Chinese yuan. Moreover, The 
average number of members in cooperatives has increased from thirteen to eighty (Zhao & Yuan 
2014, p. 33). 
Table 4.2.2.2 The Development of Registered Farmers Specialized Cooperatives  
 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Number 
(thousand) 
110.9 246.4 379.1 521.7 689 
Share Capital 
(trillion RMB) 
0.09 0.25 0.45 0.72 1.1 
 
Source: Zhao & Yuan (2014).  
By joining cooperatives, farmers do enjoy better prices than before. According to a 2009 
data about 198 farmers cooperatives in a Chinese province called Hubei, it was found that members 
could sell to their cooperatives at such favorable price as 7% higher than selling to other parties. 
Statistics also show that farmers in cooperatives have benefited from higher income. According to 
the Ministry of Agriculture, farmers joining cooperatives earn on average 10% to 20% higher 
income than those who are not members of any cooperative. Moreover, the difference increases to 
30 percent for members in a “model cooperative” (Zhao & Yuan 2014, p. 33). 
    Such results can‟t be achieved without the firm support from government at all levels. After 
the issuance of the national law, thirty provincial-level governments released relevant policies and 
sixteen of them also promulgated local regulations on the development of cooperatives by the end 
of 2011. Besides policy support, financial assistance offered by governments totaled 4.24 billion 
RMB among which 3.24 billion came from provincial level governments.( Zhao & Yuan 2014, p. 
33). 
4.2.2.3. Problems and Concerns 
Despite the achievements mentioned above, farmers cooperatives are still in the initial stage 
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with a number of problems to be solved. 
First of all, comparing with large cooperatives in other countries, cooperatives in China 
have much smaller scale on average. Only a small percentage of famers are members of 
cooperatives (Fock & Zachernuk 2006). In addition, the influence of a cooperative is often 
restricted at the village level.  
Secondly, the quality of service provided by cooperatives remains at the primary level and 
needs to be further improved. Services that members can obtain from cooperatives are mainly 
technical and information service, unified agriculture supplies purchase, unified sales and 
marketing of products as well as credit service. Research conducted by Deng, Xu and Liu (2010) 
with a sampling of 160 cooperatives in seven provinces showed that while 92.5% of the 
cooperatives provided technical and information service, the percentage dropped to 60% when it 
came to unified supply and marketing services. Only 3.1% of cooperatives managed to offer credits 
to members. The majority of cooperatives offered one to two service items and there were 4.4% of 
registered cooperatives not functioning at all. The more and more advanced services a cooperative 
provides often means the more organizational capabilities it has. For instance, unified purchase of 
supplies demands sufficient amount of fund reserve or the organizational ability to source fund in a 
short period of time. Marketing functions of a cooperative were often constrained by inadequate 
marketing expertise.  
Awareness of the benefits of farmers cooperatives is not high among Chinese farmers, since 
farmers cooperative is a brand new concept introduced only a few years ago. Farmers who already 
joined cooperatives also have inadequate knowledge about values and mechanisms of cooperatives 
as well as the basic rights they deserve. Wu‟s (2013) study of 440 household members of 
cooperatives in two provinces showed that members‟ understanding about their cooperative‟s 
surplus distribution system and charter were all below 3 on a scale of 1 to 5, with 5 meaning full 
understanding. Most farmers were not clear that the purpose of cooperatives is different from 
companies‟ profit-oriented purpose. 
Besides, internal management does not follow basic cooperative principles. In terms of 
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control, it is often the case that cooperatives are controlled by few influential figures or companies 
and that decision is not made in a democratic manner. Hu and Bijman‟s findings (2011) of 
cooperatives in Hubei province revealed that shares were distributed unevenly among members. 
Surprisingly, over 60% of shares were concentrated in founding members and chairman alone held 
28% of all shares on average, leaving minor shares to other members.  
Moreover, there is a human resource shortage of well-educated entrepreneurs who have 
sufficient knowledge and skills to manage cooperatives. In general, education level in rural areas is 
lower than that in cities. Due to prominent gap in income, educated rural students often choose to 
move to cities to work. According to a survey (Wu 2013) of 440 household members of 
cooperatives in Guangdong and Anhui provinces, the average educational level of members was 
primary school. Even in Guangdong province, which has the highest GDP in China, average 
education at the cooperative management level was junior high school. The Anhui province average 
was blow junior high school.   
Financing also remains a big obstacle for most of the cooperatives. Fund sources include 
retained earnings, share capital, membership fee, fund raised from members, donations and 
government support. However, Deng et al.‟s (2010) research found out that 36% of cooperatives 
had no source of fund. The issue is most severe in small cooperatives since government support 
usually goes to large and standardized cooperatives. There are also difficulties for those small 
cooperatives to get loans from banks. It has thus become the biggest limiting factor of growth for 
most cooperatives.   
Lastly, too much government intervention at the basic level poses big concern in the long 
run. Some village cadres take initiatives to establish cooperatives for the purpose of polishing 
political performance since the upper-level governments are attaching great importance to the 
development of cooperatives. To increase the number of membership, some may use political 
pressure or other methods to push farmers to join cooperatives. Research (Xu et.al 2011) showed 
that 69% of sample cooperatives were created as a result of town government and village cadres‟ 
initiation. Yet, those cooperatives are found to have provided less service than the ones initiated by 
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farmers voluntarily. Without democratic basis, they often fail to motivate famers and eventually 
become phantom organizations of no real value.  
The chart below gives a good summary of internal obstacles that are affecting the 
sustainability of farmers cooperatives. Respondents of leaders, members, non-members and 
government officials ranked the severity of obstacles. Results from all four groups identified that 
lack of capital was the number-one issue for cooperatives. Besides capital, issue of management 
and leadership were highlighted since both existing leaders and members ranked poor management 
as the number-three problem while government officials regarded poor management and 
unqualified leaders as two biggest obstacles. 
 
Source: Fock & Zachernuk (2006) 
At present, there is the co-existence of several types of cooperatives with distinctive 
features. The type of a cooperative is usually determined by the nature of the initiator or the leader. 
Many studies made clear that different types of cooperatives vary in operational efficiency. A big 
contributing factor to this result is the initiator‟s relationship with members as well the initiator‟s 
resources and capabilities. Therefore, the author considers the leadership issue and management 
issue as highly related. Considering the relative importance, the two issues are the focus of 
discussion in the next chapter.  
Table 4.2.2.3 Primary Internal Obstacles to Sustainability of Farmer Associations  
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4.2.3. Analysis of Common Types of Cooperatives in China 
In China, huge discrepancies in local development level together with grassroots 
explorations in farmer cooperation before formal regulation was in place have resulted in the 
heterogenous feature of cooperatives. Initiators of cooperatives range from farmers to processors, 
village cadres, NGOs and agriculture-related companies. While farmers‟ initiation is the most 
consistent with the value and purpose of cooperatives, non-farmer parties are more active to take 
initiatives because of Chinese farmers‟ limited resources and ability at the moment. These initiators, 
although with diverse backgrounds, are often core leaders who exert big influence on the 
development of cooperatives (Garnevska, Liu & Shadbolt 2011). 
A study found (Garnevska et al. 2011) that an initiator took multiple roles of the board 
member, manager, and member of the cooperative. The role of a board member requires an 
initiator‟s vision to chart a proper direction of future development; the role of a manager requires 
the initiator‟s ability to deploy resources and execute goals; the role of a member has totally 
different demands on the initiator‟s ability to fulfill the contract, to commit to the goal, and to 
supervise the board and the management.   
There is the consensus that good leadership is an essential success factor for cooperatives 
(Fock & Zachernuk 2006). A qualified leader is expected to have access to financial, human and 
social capital (Bijman & Hu 2011). Scholars describe attributes of successful leaders as: 
management capability, expertise in production and marketing, respect from members as well as 
motivation to contribute (Fock & Zachernuk 2006). In addition, broad vision, open-mindedness, 
communication skills and good education are also identified to be critical (Garnevska et al. 2011).  
The nature of cooperatives leads to complicated roles a leader should take. The leader‟s 
capability is even more critical when Chinese farmers have low level of education and show 
insufficient knowledge about cooperatives. This chapter will therefore analyze common types of 
cooperatives established by different initiators and compare their performances. 
4.2.3.1. Cooperatives Led by Government-Related Institutions   
Government-related institutions refer to government agriculture departments at the basic 
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level and quasi-governmental associations that are affiliated to government departments. Different 
institutions leverage on their unique advantages to lead the establishment and management of 
cooperatives. Low-level government institutions summon farmers and set up cooperatives using 
authoritative power and are in a good position to pass on government policy and financial support. 
Agro-technology promotion centers that are common in villages and towns help transform 
technology achievements into agricultural productivity by leading cooperatives and working 
closely with farmers. These centers can also make advantage of existing assets such as buildings 
and facilities to use for cooperative activities. Besides, agriculture industry associations can utilize 
their network of human resources to provide expertise and market information to cooperatives they 
establish.  
These institutions are able to bring in the assets, information, technology and knowhow that 
farmers have little access to. However, the top-down approach causes a major problem that farmer 
members are not motivated enough to participate in the cooperative affairs and therefore these 
cooperatives tend to lose vitality in the long run. There is also the risk that cooperatives end up 
becoming an actual affiliate of government institutions or an instrument to acquire political 
resources (Guo & Zhang 2010). In the present situation, this model is easier to succeed in the initial 
period, yet its future growth is constrained by a lack of closely linked interests between institutions 
and farmers. It is therefore a makeshift model, whereas the ultimate goal is to transfer leadership to 
farmers (Hu 2009). 
4.2.3.2. Cooperatives Led by Non-Governmental Organizations   
NGOs also take initiatives to lead cooperatives out of passion and good-will for public 
welfare. A particular feature of this type is that these cooperatives are set up in firm accordance 
with the classic cooperative principles. Hence, these cooperatives are usually well structured and 
operated in a standardized way. An emphasis is also placed on member education and the 
cultivation of cooperative culture (Hu 2009). 
The drawbacks of this type include interests conflict between the non-profit nature of NGOs 
and the for-profit objective of cooperatives in the market; the discrepancy between an advanced 
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organizational structure and the laggard state of business; and the gap between high requirements 
on managers versus their true capabilities to achieve effective management (Hu 2009). In view of 
the drawbacks, in particular the contradiction in interests, the author is not optimistic about NGOs‟ 
ability to lead cooperatives to compete for profits. But on the other hand, NGOs can function as 
consultants to cooperatives on issues of structure standardization and human resource management. 
Furthermore, the nature of NGOs justifies them as candid supervisors for the purpose of promoting 
fairness and common welfare. 
4.2.3.3. Cooperatives Led by Agriculture-Related Companies  
In this model, companies in the agriculture industry participating in value-adding activities 
such as processing or sales, will take the lead to form farmers cooperatives and absorb membership 
from farmers. By connecting with a large number of small-scale farmers through the intermediate 
cooperatives, companies can secure stable source of raw materials which are primary products 
produced by farmers. It is also easier to implement quality control and increase overall quality 
traceability using the organizational capability of the cooperative. Moreover and very importantly, 
transaction costs can be significantly lowered. Before this model comes into being, companies used 
to deal with individual farmers through a model which is often referred to as the “companies plus 
individual farmers” model. Because of the Household Contract Responsibility System, farming 
activities are usually performed by individual farmers in very small scale. To secure enough raw 
materials, companies have to sign contract with numerous farmers beforehand, negotiate terms one 
by one, collect products and make small payments, which inevitably lead to high transaction costs. 
It is also hard to control product quality from numerous sources. Moreover, the default rate is 
commonly high at the negotiated time of delivery. When supply is short and market is offering a 
better price, farmers tend to default and sell directly to the market. Since it may cost companies 
more to initiate legal proceedings with a small farmer whose transaction volume is tiny, companies 
tend to let things drift. On the other hand, when market price is low, companies see incentive to 
default and try to decline products from contracted farmers. Now that small farmers have neither 
money nor power to go for a lawsuit, they often choose to endure it.  
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The cooperative therefore offers a good platform to resolve the default and transaction costs 
issue by bringing the two sides into one entity with common interests. Instead of dealing with 
numerous farmers, companies can deal with the cooperative to sign a single contract and impose 
quality standards. After receiving the contract from companies, a cooperative will implement the 
contract by planning for production, purchasing supplies, providing technical assistance, collecting 
products from members, supervising product quality and distributing profits in proportion to profit 
contribution. Despite the benefits cooperatives bring, there are few existing and functioning 
cooperatives that satisfy companies‟ needs. In this case, companies will take the lead to invest 
assets and establish cooperatives.  
However, companies usually control the management of cooperatives leaving little power to 
farmers. Managers come from companies and make decisions with little involvement of farmer 
members. They take the majority of shares and have a tendency to distribute profits unevenly. In all, 
in the company-led cooperative model, farmers can lower market risks, gain more profits and more 
importantly they get to cultivate a sense of cooperation, yet they usually have limited rights and 
voices. 
4.2.3.4. Cooperatives Led by Rural Elites  
Comparing with the three types mentioned above, the rural elites-led cooperative is the 
closest to the ideal farmers cooperative since rural elites are part of the farmer group and have high 
appeal to other farmers. It has been recognized by scholars as an effective way to operate 
cooperatives under the current Chinese conditions. Rural elites are large producers, farmers with 
large sales, village cadres as well as rural residents with capital, technology background or prestige. 
They use their personal capabilities and charisma to attract membership to form cooperatives. In 
this way, their individual resources like sales channel and marketing expertise are utilized for the 
common interests.  
Local farmers are familiar with these rural elites, trust their abilities and usually respond to 
their appeals. In an organization where trust is one of the cornerstones, rural elites‟ strong network 
plays an important role. It is also in line with the original intention of cooperatives to improve 
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people‟s livelihoods through mutual help.  
In contrast with the top-down approach initiated by the government institutions, this model 
is bottom up and therefore has more participation from farmers. Sustainability is therefore 
enhanced. It is worth noting that rural elites often take dominant roles in cooperatives and in most 
cases famers are ruled out from decision-making. Advantages of the model include fast decision 
making, lower management costs and operational efficiency (Hu 2009). 
At the same time, the rural elites-led model often causes problems that they dominate the 
management without regard to the organizational rules. Therefore, the organizational structure and 
operation are often not standardized. In addition, the personal influence and network of rural elites 
may restrict the future development of a cooperative to a large scale. The cooperative may also be 
troubled by the ambiguity in property rights, which makes it hard to differentiate the elites‟ 
personal properties from common properties (Guo & Zhang 2010). When losses incur, farmer 
members may not be willing to share responsibility of operational losses and initiators will have to 
assume excessive responsibilities. Result like this will in turn hurt rural elites‟ motivation. Hu 
(2009) listed three reasons to explain the happening of this situation. Firstly, farmers are not fully 
aware of the necessity to follow proper procedures of production, which thus results in substandard 
products. Secondly, members‟ understanding about the cooperative charter is inadequate. Lastly, 
leaders tend to overlook the importance of member training and education.  
In all, against the current backdrop of low education and insufficient management 
capabilities among farmers, it is an effective transitional model to leverage on rural elites‟ resources 
and prepare farmers for future leadership. 
The farmer producers-led cooperative model is the ideal type of farmers cooperatives since 
cooperatives are owned, controlled by farmers and all benefits go to farmer members. However, 
most farmers at the current stage are not able to initiate or successfully manage a cooperative and 
hence demand external support. 
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CHAPTER 5. THE THREE-STAGE APPROACH TO 
COOPERATIVE DEVELOPMENT 
Considering the imbalanced situation of regional development in China as well as the social 
and cultural diversities, it is reasonable to believe that cooperative will not develop at the same 
pace. On the contrary, a mix of different types will continue to co-exist across the country. While 
this chapter is not aimed at promoting a single solution, it is intended to propose a reasonable 
three-stage approach that addresses problems and demands at different stages. 
Section 1. THE THREE-STAGE APPROACH 
The three-stage approach starts with company-led cooperatives, to rural elites-led 
cooperatives as a transitional stage and finally approaches the last stage of farmers-led cooperatives. 
The criteria for selection is the fundamental cooperative philosophy of “owned by, controlled by 
and benefits for the farmers” as well as the degree of feasibility against the socioeconomic 
backdrop. 
Proceeding from the first stage to the last, power and benefits for farmer members are 
supposed to be enhanced along with increasing demands on their capabilities to run a cooperative 
democratically. In essence, the international movement of cooperation is indeed a movement of 
culture that transforms traditional farmers into a new generation of farmers with the ability and 
vision to effectively cooperate with others (Hu 2009). This transformation of farmers can not be 
realized overnight, since most Chinese farmers‟ cooperation spirit, entrepreneurial courage and 
overall market capabilities are so far from enough to effectively and democratically lead 
cooperatives that any bold change may give rise to utter chaos. Taking account of the difficulty, the 
author believes that it is inevitably a time consuming process to gradually guide and cultivate 
farmers to become qualified decision makers and that this transformation should be carried out in a 
staged and progressive fashion.   
In the first stage, agriculture-related companies engaging in processing, sales and relevant 
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services of agricultural products take the lead to form cooperatives while farmers join as members 
and produce products. Comparing with other organizations such as NGOs and governmental 
institutions, companies are most familiar with the competitive market and they demonstrate a high 
degree of vitality and flexibility in economic activities, which can‟t be matched by non-profit 
organizations or governmental institutions. Moreover, companies engaging in various 
agriculture-related activities and of different scales can be found throughout China to be paired 
with cooperatives that feature similar diversity in demands. It is considered by the author as, by far, 
the most feasible and economical way to facilitate cooperatives‟ participation in the Chinese 
market.  
In this cooperation, both sides can be better off. By working and trading with cooperatives, 
companies are able to secure steady supply and lower transaction costs since they no longer have to 
deal with small farmers one by one. Cooperatives serve as the intermediary that on one hand 
negotiate purchasing contract with companies and on the other, implement the contract by 
organizing, supporting and supervising productions that are carried out by farmers. Farmers receive 
assignment from cooperatives and produce according to the quantity and quality requirements. To 
facilitate farmers‟ compliance with the contract and quality standards, companies may provide 
additional services such as extending technical assistance and securing supplies. After contracts are 
successfully fulfilled, retained earnings are distributed in proportion to each member‟s patronage as 
well as capital investment, after part of the surplus is devoted to cooperative reserve.     
When transactions between farmers and companies are internalized, single shot transactions 
become repetitive games where farmers and companies trade with each other frequently. The higher 
the frequency becomes, the less the uncertainties of trustworthiness, behaviors, quality and prices 
become. Moreover, both sides have incentives to refrain from opportunistic actions so as to build 
credibility and gain long-term benefits. Enforcement costs may therefore be reduced thanks to 
higher mutual trust and the intermediary role of cooperatives. In general, transaction costs to search 
and verify trading partners, to negotiate contract terms as well as to enforce a contract will be cut 
down. As a result, cooperatives provide a mechanism to mitigate market risks and lower transaction 
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costs for both companies and farmers.  
While farmers can benefit from agriculture company-led cooperatives, it is also mentioned 
in the last chapter that as members of a cooperative, farmers‟ rights may be infringed by companies 
holding much greater power. In addition, driven by self-interests, the companies, controlling 
decision making in reality, are likely to squeeze out profits from farmers to feather their own nests. 
To make sure the cooperative is managed with fairness, effective supervision mechanisms should 
be in place.  
In the second stage, rural elites rather than companies take a leading role in cooperatives.  
They take over power by either initiating a new cooperative or getting elected by members as the 
dominant force that manages to recapture leadership from agriculture companies in existing 
cooperatives. While in stage one companies as profit-oriented entities are likely to infringe upon 
farmers‟ decision making rights in order to maximize their own profits, rural elites belong to the 
same farmer category and are concerned with similar interests and issues as ordinary farmers. In 
this stage, conflicts of interest are expected to be mitigated to some extent.   
Rural elites have close connections with farmers and share common interests to strengthen 
bargaining power on the market. Comparing with ordinary farmers, they possess greater economic, 
political or social status that enables them to drum up membership and play the leading role. 
However, as mentioned in the previous chapter, rural elites have low level of education in general 
and their understanding about basic principles, mechanism and democratic governance of 
cooperatives are limited. In rural elites-led cooperatives, organizational structure and management 
are not as standardized as those initiated by NGOs that are clear about cooperative theories and 
comply with the fundamentals. However, there is no doubt that the rural elites model is the closest 
to the ideal farmers cooperative model and that it is an effective transitional stage to finally hand 
over the leadership power to small scale farmers.  
In view of the common constraints of rural elites, the author suggests the utilization of the 
national talent pool of „college graduate village officials‟, who are educated, ambitious, 
open-minded and therefore can complement the shortcomings of rural elites. Since the „college 
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graduate village official program‟ has very unique Chinese characteristics, the author will elaborate 
on the leadership of young college graduates in cooperatives in another section later.  
Following the second stage that is led by rural elites, the third stage finally features the 
leadership of ordinary farmers, who have familiarized themselves with how cooperatives work and 
have developed their overall capabilities while participating in cooperatives. Farmers get to 
exercise decision making and control power directly and democratically, thus they can prioritize 
their ultimate demands as the cooperative goal. This is the ideal model according to the cooperative 
principals. Yet, to govern cooperatives with efficiency, continuous institutional support is needed. 
Section 2. LEADERSHIP IN THE TRANSITIONAL STAGE 
5.2.1. College-Graduate Village Officials 
College graduate village officials, as the name suggests, are college graduates who are 
recruited as officials in under-developed rural villages. This program was started in 2008 by the 
central government in an effort to provide well-educated human resources to support the rural 
development as well as to alleviate the employment difficulties in cities.  
On April the 10th, 2008, an official document was released jointly by the Organization 
Department of the CPC, Ministry of Education, Ministry of Finance as well as the Ministry of 
Human Resources and Social Security of the People‟s Republic of China. According to the 
document (Organization Department of the CPC 2009), the program is intended to select 20,000 
qualified college graduates annually for five years in a row with a target total number of 100,000 
students to be sent to villages. Applicants will be evaluated based on their overall competitiveness 
but CPC party members are preferred. These Party member graduates will normally be assigned as 
assistants to the village Party secretary, while non-Party member graduates will assist the head of 
the village committee. These young graduates are expected to improve rural governance since they 
“are often from cosmopolitan, urban backgrounds, and may act as counterweights to local officials, 
who tend to be undereducated and provincial in outlook”( Tedesco 2012). Once their work is 
recognized by the locals, they are entitled to run in the election of Party secretary and other village 
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positions. Salaries and allowances are decided according to the level of income received by newly 
graduated officials employed at the township government. Extra allowances are paid to those 
working at remote and poverty-stricken areas.   
The employment contract is two to three years. After the contract expires, they can choose 
either to renew the contract if performance appraisal is passed or to seek job on their own. In honor 
of their special contributions, they enjoy favorable policies such as bonus points in national civil 
servant exams and graduate school exams ( Organization Department of the CPC 2009). 
In the year of 2010, under the impact of global financial crisis, government support for the 
program strengthened by resetting the target to recruit 200,000 college graduate village officials by 
2012. The new policy was welcomed by college students who were under heightened employment 
pressure at the time. It was reported („Total target‟ 2014) that about 2 million students in total had 
applied for the program by 2011. In July, 2012, when the first five-year-plan came to an end, the 
central government released a new policy document to further facilitate the program. According to 
the new policy (Organization Department of the CPC 2012), half of the villages in China should 
have one college graduate officials by 2015, which means a total number of 300,000 students 
should be recruited. In three to five years‟ time, every town should on average have two college 
graduate village officials taking chief positions of the village committee and the village Party. By 
the end of 2013, the number of college graduate village officials surged to 220,000 people („Total 
target‟ 2014). 
However the onrushing momentum took a sudden turn when the central government, for the 
first time, cut down the target number from 300,000 to 150,000. Experts („Total target‟ 2014) 
analyzed that the intensifying employment issue after contract expiration was the main cause of the 
downsizing. Although student officials receive favorable treatments when applying for civil servant 
or graduate school, the real advantage is not apparent since the surge in the total number of college 
graduate officials has greatly aggravated the internal competition. Moreover, their two to three 
years‟ devotion to rural affairs at the grassroots level may alienate them from their original college 
majors, office work or exam preparation.  
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Therefore, future career of college graduate village officials has become an urgent problem 
to be solved if the program is to be well sustained. Regarding this issue, the central government has 
been proposing various ways to help these young officials settle down in a new career. They are 
encouraged to start their own businesses or set up organizations of technical promotion, social 
service as well as farmer cooperatives. Government will provide financial backing such as lending 
and subsidies to support their activities. 
5.2.2. College-Graduate Village Officials‟ Leadership in Cooperatives 
According to a report („Three million‟ 2014) of the college graduate village official program 
released in 2014, over 30,000 young officials started their own business after the tenure, creating 
266,000 new jobs for farmers. They have initiated over 20,000 start-up projects, among which 
5,204 are farmers cooperatives.  
When starting cooperatives, these college graduates have clear advantages. First of all, they 
have received four years of college education in cities which often means they have the best 
educational background in a village. Four years of higher education have equipped them with 
broader knowledge, wider vision and a skill set including information search and analytical skills, 
computer skills, learning ability and language skills. Comparing with local farmers, their city 
experiences have also enabled them to gain insights into city life and adapt to the city market. As a 
college graduate official wrote (He 2012), experience of organizing events and managing student 
societies help some students obtain managerial capabilities, communication skills as well as 
problem solving skills that are essential to cooperative management. In addition to that, their major 
in college such as law, agriculture, marketing allow them to bring in extra expertise to assist the 
operation of cooperatives. 
Secondly, the village official position itself gives them favorable conditions to take a 
leadership role in the future. According to the latest official document (Organization Department of 
the CPC 2012), in the second year of service, qualified and capable college graduate officials are 
suggested to assume chief positions of the village committee or the village Party. Their 
responsibilities include promoting projects to increase farmers‟ income as well as leading or jointly 
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leading farmers cooperatives. Their first year in village helps them keep in close contact with 
government officials, engage with farmers, learn about agriculture and the local situation as well as 
take on village administrative work as a village leader. Such intensive on-job training will facilitate 
them to adapt to the local community and work out how things get done in the local way. As a 
result, those experiences will complement their disadvantages of being unsophisticated newly 
graduated outsiders and prepare them for management positions in cooperatives. In general, they 
have more hands-on experiences, credibility, political power and policy support in villages than 
other urban entrepreneurs. Meanwhile they are more educated than rural elites to understand 
cooperative theories and introduce standardized structure.   
Thirdly, college graduate officials serve as a channel connecting government support and 
farmer demands. The Chinese government has been providing various kinds of support to 
encourage these officials to set up cooperatives. As the official document stated (Organization 
Department of the CPC 2012), government will innovate financial services to offer lending, credit 
guarantee and subsidies to assist fund-raising. Furthermore, government will integrate resources 
from agriculture, technology, poverty-alleviation and other relevant departments as well as 
intelligence from research and education institutions to provide services including project 
assessment, technical assistance and market information for their projects. In addition, government 
efforts have also extended to guiding and encouraging enterprises and NGOs to give support to 
college graduate officials‟ initiations. With government backing, young officials are able to acquire 
and apply various resources to develop cooperatives, which is otherwise hard to realize by farmers. 
On the other hand, working and living at the grassroots will enable officials to get a deeper 
understanding about farmers‟ worries and demands. The program is therefore a good platform to 
reflect farmers‟ demands and try to match them with institutional support.  
Lastly, being a much-talked-about topic of the public, college graduate officials‟ 
involvement often draws media attention. Media exposures and public attention are advantageous 
and free vehicles of marketing that should not be neglected, especially for cooperatives with limited 
budget but are eager to expand marketing channels.  
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With such advantageos, college graduate officials‟ educational background, current position 
and policy support together offer them favorable conditions to engage in cooperatives. Very 
importantly, their salaries are paid by the government, therefore there is no economic pressure on 
the cooperative side to employ them. Leveraging on this opportunity, some outstanding young 
officials have initiated cooperatives during their tenure and achieved remarkable results of 
improving farmers‟ income. For those who are not capable of leading cooperatives during their 
term, their firsthand experience of learning and working in existing cooperatives will prepare them 
for future entrepreneurial endeavors.     
Young officials gain valuable assets by participating in cooperatives. Through hands-on 
involvement, they put theories into practices and acquire workable knowledge about the operation 
of cooperatives which is more valuable than book knowledge. In addition, comparing with their 
daily administrative work as a village official, experience in a cooperative is more 
business-oriented and is therefore a precious opportunity to build up business and marketing skills. 
Moreover, guiding cooperative production and effectively communicating with farmers demand 
understanding about agriculture, which in turn stimulates young officials to master some production 
techniques. Furthermore, while efforts paid in village administrative work including a good number 
of paperwork may not demonstrate quick results or visible influence on the rural economy, 
economic benefits of cooperatives are straightforward. Farmers‟ active response to the success of a 
cooperative can greatly motivate young officials‟ and increase their confidence. Apart from mental 
fulfillment, revenue from cooperatives also rewards extra income to young officials whose fixed 
salary could barely make ends meet. 
The leading function that college graduates play brings about additional meaning in rural 
development for that it is transforming Chinese students‟ perspective on working in the countryside. 
The long-standing view among college graduates is that going to the village is a step-back towards 
poverty and failure, while cities stand for opportunities and success. This viewpoint has started to 
change since young officials are taking critical roles and have truly contributed to overall welfare of 
the rural society. It demonstrates that there are precious opportunities in China‟s villages for young 
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talents (Tedesco 2012). 
5.2.3. Problems and Concerns 
Meanwhile, quite a number of problems and concerns are noteworthy. First of all, most of 
the college-graduate officials work in cooperatives in a part-time rather than full-time manner. 
Their major responsibilities lie in village administration. Yet, organizing cooperatives demands a lot 
of efforts. Secondly, it is hard to communicate with farmers who have their own way of thinking 
and expression (Ma & Yang 2010). It takes young officials, who are born and raised in cities, 
tremendous efforts to understand the differences, speak the same language and finally persuade 
local farmers. To fit in with the local community means a lot of preliminary work to get a grasp on 
farmers‟ values and true concerns. Thirdly, young officials have expressed concerns about their 
insufficient personal capabilities. For one thing, because the concept of farmers specialized 
cooperative has just emerged since 2006, young officials have little knowledge or training before 
joining a cooperative. Even for people who have already started a cooperative, how to effectively 
manage the organization remains an issue. According to a survey conducted by Agricultural 
Management Institute of Ministry of Agriculture (Wei 2011), 84% of college graduate official 
respondents from eight provinces and municipalities admitted a lack of professional knowledge. 
74% of them responded that they hadn't had any training concerning cooperative knowledge. For 
another, few of the officials majored in agriculture back in college which creates a mismatch 
between what they can offer and what farmers demand. Farmers hope that young officials can do 
more than simply managing administrative work in cooperatives, since local experienced officials 
may do a better job in this aspect. They expect young officials to leverage on their professional 
background and bring in external resources to solve problems in an innovative and efficient way 
(Wu 2010). Yet, due to strong government push and relatively loose selection process, the 
background, personal capability and original intention of young officials vary widely.  
The harsh working conditions and low salary are also recognized as major concerns for 
young officials. The problem is even intensified by the increasing gap between rural areas and 
cities. Those born in cities may find it difficult to adapt to the way of living in rural areas, which is 
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not only impoverished in material life but also deficient in spiritual life. Infrastructure and facilities 
such as convenient transportation, internet, library, cinema are rarely found in villages. Furthermore, 
they constantly feel the pressure from college peers who are working in cities and gaining far better 
salary. After all, in China, most students study extremely hard to excel in fierce competition so as to 
get a good job and improve life quality. Therefore, working in rural areas requires extraordinary 
determination and mental toughness.  
A related issue of this is the insecure future career prospect. Anxiety is felt by many young 
officials since those who could not make it to the position of either head of village committee or 
secretary of the village Party generally can not renew the contract but have to leave the position 
after the term terminated. According to a survey (Liu 2010), results showed that 59% of college 
graduate officials would like to attend the civil servant examination after their tenure, while 23% of 
them intended to stay and 17% would like to start their own business. The clear priority of being a 
civil servant reflects young officials‟ demand for a stable job in the government and a higher social 
status. According to Liu (2010), being a village official is more of a short-term and voluntary 
choice to college graduates, rather than a life-time career. Because of the future instability, some 
young officials who have successfully started a business or led a cooperative expressed that if they 
could not stabilize their career as official government cadres, they would rather quit and leave. The 
stability problem of leadership is an obstacle for cooperatives to develop under consistent 
management. Besides, the venture of initiating a cooperative demands certain risk resistance 
capacity. However, the slender income they receive does not allow them to take high risks.  
Lastly, since most young labors have gone to cities, the remaining farmers are the seniors, 
women and children, who tend to be conservative and less willing to take risks. To explain the basic 
principles and benefits of cooperatives as well as to appeal to them to join a cooperative takes more 
efforts than usual. 
5.2.4. Solutions 
To deal with problems and concerns mentioned above, this thesis proposes the following 
solutions. Considering the lack of necessary knowledge among college graduate officials, 
 53 
government ought to provide more systematic training such as incorporating contents of 
cooperative management as part of the college graduate official training courses. Relevant 
institutions‟ advocacy and media publicity are critical to raise awareness among farmers towards 
farmers specialized cooperatives. Higher awareness will help reduce hurdle of indifference or 
resistance and thus evoke grassroots participation. Similarly, member training should be 
strengthened so as to facilitate comprehension of cooperative strategy, effective implementation of 
tasks as well as succession of leadership in the future. To supplement internal training done by 
cooperatives, training sessions organized by basic level governments are also necessary. As Ma and 
Yang (2010) pointed out, member training builds up farmers‟ understanding and hence improves 
young officials‟ working environment as well as their performances.  
Besides efforts on training, financial assistance is needed to sustain young officials‟ 
undertaking. Currently, these young officials possess low risk tolerance due to low salary, small 
initial capital, as well as difficulties to acquire external capital. Financial assistance should come in 
various forms such as subsidies, interest-free credit and monetary rewards that are easily accessible 
to young officials. 
Additionally, the author suggests institutional modification of the College Graduate Village 
Official program to include farmers cooperatives as places of service. College graduates holding 
cooperative positions will enjoy equal salary and policy treatment as village officials do. Qualified 
young officials who could not make it to the village head or secretary of the village Party still have 
the opportunity to stay as a manager of cooperatives. It provides a stable job opportunity for 
capable officials and motivates them to devote to work since future instability is reduced to some 
extent. 
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Section 3. FURTHER EXPLANATION ON THE THREE-STAGE APPROACH 
Source: created by the author 
The three-step approach is designed to propel growth of cooperatives as well as to 
strengthen farmer members‟ democratic control over the cooperative and increase their proportion 
of income from the cooperative pool over time. This proposal is consistent with the very core of 
farmers cooperatives, that are equal member status, democratic control, common interests of all 
members, and fair distribution of surplus. It can be translated into a goal to realize cooperative 
governance on the basis of fairness, transparency and democracy.  
In terms of fairness, the author basically refers it to the fair distribution of profits inside the 
cooperative. A simple formula can be used to explain how profits are distributed internally. Total 
profits gained from the market is written as Profit, while farmers gain Profit (F), other member 
categories such as agriculture-related companies gain Profit (X) and cooperative management 
retain Profit (C). Profit (C) includes reserve funds and development funds at the cooperative level 
as well as private earnings that the management captures. The formula goes as: Profit = Profit 
(F)+Profit (X)+Profit (C). When total profit is stable, any increase in profit of one party will 
inevitably hurt profits that other parties could access to. If all parties have high morality and are 
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willing to fairly distribute income according to the cooperative charter, then fight for profit 
allocation will not be an issue. However, in reality, these parties are driven by their own interests 
and therefore are motivated to prioritize their gains over others. Fair distribution is indeed not an 
easy task. In the Chinese farmers cooperatives case, since membership can include non-farmer 
constituents, these cooperatives with heterogeneous members are multi-stakeholder cooperatives. 
Conflicts of interests are likely to be aggravated to a higher level in multi-stakeholder cooperatives 
because one group of stakeholders often plays the dominant role and may allocate profits 
lopsidedly in favor of themselves.  
In the three-stage model, the author is not attempting to fulfill the unrealistic goal of 
eradicating the uneven allocation issue overnight, but instead, would tolerate its existence with the 
purpose that economic gains could stimulate competitive parties‟ entrepreneurial spirit to the 
greatest extent. Note that this is, in no circumstances, freewheeling without any constraint. 
Supervision and control systems from both inside and outside are indispensable to safeguard the 
basic rights of the disadvantaged groups. This perspective draws lessons from a national 
development policy by Deng Xiaoping, a great leader and the “architect” of the Chinese 
modernization construction, who proposed a new way of thinking to integrate market economy 
with the socialist ideology into a “socialist market economy”. The socialist market economy 
method is intended to reconcile the tension between the socialist goal of common prosperity and 
the demand for economic development to compete globally. This pragmatic approach is proven to 
have reshaped people‟s perspective towards socialism and have greatly supported the Chinese 
economy. 
Quoting from Deng Xiaoping (Whiteley 2007), "According to Marxism, communist society 
is based on material abundance. Only when there is material abundance can the principle of a 
communist society be applied. The principles of socialism are: first, development of production and 
second, common prosperity. We permit some people and some regions to become prosperous first, 
for the purpose of achieving common prosperity faster." The author considers this viewpoint to be 
applicable to cooperatives since the fundamental question is the same for both cases, that is to 
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balance the market-oriented development goal with the pursuit of common interests. Specialized 
farmers cooperative is, in itself, a product as well as a means of the socialist market economy. 
Therefore, permitting some groups of members to become prosperous first so as to maximize 
profits from the market is not in conflict with the purpose of achieving common interests and fair 
distribution later. In fact, it may accelerate the process. 
With this view point, the author regards agriculture-related companies as proper leadership 
candidates for the initial stage in the hope that these profit-driven market veterans can capitalize on 
their resources and market experiences to enhance competitiveness of cooperatives, and therefore 
maximize total profits gained from the market. To enlarge the cake of total profits, how the cake is 
cut is likely to sacrifice fairness to some extent. In the profit formula, Profit (X) is expected to be 
large, but Profit (F) is relatively small, although still larger than farmers who are not cooperative 
members. The main objective at this stage is to enhance market competitiveness, reduce transaction 
costs and achieve scale economies. United small-scale farmers will benefit from increased income 
and enhanced bargaining power than before, although such benefits are anticipated to be limited. 
Another critical task at this stage is to familiarize members with the concept of farmers 
cooperatives which is new to most people. Since companies play the leading role, human resources 
of the management mainly come from dominant companies. To protect the basic right of farmer 
members, internal supervision by supervisors, the supervisory board, accountants and member 
themselves are indispensable. However, more importantly, external supervision should be 
particularly strengthened, taking into account the fact that farmer members have little internal 
power to constrain the dominant stakeholders. External auditors and relevant governmental bureaus 
are feasible supervisors to check on conducts of those companies. Trust is key to success among 
farmers, the management and company members so as to maintain a working relationship and get 
internal contracts fulfilled, otherwise transaction costs reduction could not be realized. Besides 
trusts and ethics, supervision is also a key success factor, because if farmers‟ basic rights are not 
secured, a cooperative is doomed to fail. Table 5.2.4 (B) is a summary of the three-stage approach, 
recapitulating the main points of objectives, key success factors and criteria of each stage. 
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In the second stage, leadership of companies is replaced by rural elites, who are part of the 
larger farmer group, thus transferring power from companies to the farmer group. Rural elites refer 
to large farming households, village cadres, villagers with capital, technical advantages or high 
prestige. Conflicts of interest are supposed to be mitigated because rural elites and farmers share 
more essential similarities in interests, though rural elites are apt to abuse their power in 
cooperatives for personal economic or political gains. Being the influential figures among farmers, 
they have strong networks and enjoy a high level of trust from members, so the trust issue in the 
previous stage is not prominent now. Main objectives at this stage include further empowerment of 
farmers, cultivation of cooperative leaders at the grassroots and more profits distributed to the 
farmer group. The profit formula in this case will see a large Profit (C), noting that rural elites as 
the management are separated from ordinary members here. Profit (F) of the farmer group will be 
improved, while Profit (X) will decrease as a result of relatively weakened position of other 
member categories like agriculture-related companies. Although rural elites are expected to show 
more care for the larger farmer group due to homogeneity in backgrounds, sympathy as well as the 
pressure of public opinions from the rural community, support and supervision are necessary to 
regulate their conducts since they are not familiar with standardized business organizations and 
tend to act arbitrarily, in addition to the abuse of authority to pursue personal benefits.  
Marketing capabilities and financing are key success factors at this stage, especially for 
cooperatives without other member categories and should resort to internal resources for self 
reliance. Moreover, it is important to avoid too much intervention from government bodies at the 
basic level since some rural elites, village cadres in particular, have strong political backgrounds. 
The top-down government approach is proved to be detrimental to cooperatives that should be set 
up and managed in a bottom up fashion. On the other hand, rural elites should actively seek policy 
and financial support provided by the government that could become crucial resources for 
small-scale cooperatives. 
In the final stage, ordinary farmers who become educated and informed in previous stages 
turn into the dominating force. The general assembly and a board constituted mostly by farmer 
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members come into power and help farmers gain full control of cooperatives. Although differences 
in interests also exist in the farmer group, when subgroups‟ demands and voices are heard, they will 
act as counterbalances to each other to ensure that decision is made with considerations to different 
factors and can reflect the collective interests of the cooperative. The objective at this stage is to 
realize democratic control and fair distribution of profits. The profit formula will see a large Profit 
(F) that farmers deserve according to the distribution principles. Key to success at this stage is HR 
management. Since leadership comes internally from farmer members, cultivating qualified leaders 
with management capabilities is critical. Besides, democratic control also puts requirements on 
every farmer member to be concerned and informed. Member training and education programs 
should be routinized to further their growth to keep up with development of the cooperative. 
Transparency is another key success factor to facilitate decision marking and supervision of the 
business in order to serve the interests of members. This ideal model reflects the essential principals 
of cooperatives, yet at the moment there is sure to be a tough way ahead towards actualization. 
Table 5.2.4 (B) The Three Stage Approach   Source: Created by the author 
  Stage 1 Stage 2 Stage 3 
Objective  Enhance market 
competitiveness and 
achieve economies of 
scale;  
Increase member income 
and enhance farmers‟ 
bargaining power; 
Familiarize members 
with cooperatives;                                                 
Further empowering 
farmers to exercise 
control right; Cultivate 
leadership from the 
grassroots; More 
benefits towards 
farmers    
Democratic control by 
farmers; Fair 
distribution of profits; 
Transparency 
Factors to Consider Governance Company-led  Rural elites-led  Farmers-led 
Human Resource Managers from company 
members  
Rural elites as 
managers  
Farmers as managers / 
external managers 
employed  
Dominant Company members The management  Farmer members 
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Table 5.2.4 (B) The Three Stage Approach   Source: Created by the author 
Stakeholders 
Supervision  Importance attached to 
external supervision: 
auditors, government 
bureau to complement 
weak internal control 
(supervisors, board of 
supervisors; accountants; 
members)    
Internal and external 
supervision, while 
external supervision 
still demands special 
attention 
Internal and external 
supervision 
Key Success Factors   Trust; supervision 
Balance interests; 
Supervision to safeguard 
farmers‟ interests; 
fulfillment of contract  
Marketing 
Capabilities; 





Transparency   
Leadership capability; 





owned by users ; controlled 
by users (decision making, 
voices heard);benefits for 
users (fair distribution of 
profits; lower costs and 
higher income) 
 owned by users  Yes  Yes  Yes  
controlled by 
users 
Little  More  Most  
benefits for users Little  More  Most  
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CHAPTER 6. CONCLUSION 
To industrialize the Chinese agricultural industry and enhance farmers‟ income, farmers 
cooperatives should be strongly promoted and supported. The Chinese specialized farmers 
cooperatives differ from the international standards in multiple ways in order to suit the unique 
Chinese situation. The Chinese model allows some flexibility than international standards in terms 
of membership, voting rights and profit distribution. While the classic international model features 
homogenous membership, Chinese farmers cooperatives permit heterogenous groups of members 
such as agriculture-related companies and non-profit organizations. Compared with the one person 
one vote international rule, cooperatives in China are allowed to allocate additional voting rights to 
members with big contributions. Moreover, the distribution of profits could be made to reward 
capital investment, as long as at least 60% of total profits are distributed in proportion to 
transaction volume.  
Besides institutional variations, the co-existence of heterogeneous types of cooperative 
leadership is noteworthy in China. To a great extent, initiators‟ capabilities and control over 
decision making and profit distribution influence efficiency and farmers‟ well-being in different 
types. In most cases, farmers are weak in power and therefore their interests are not prioritized by 
the dominant member group. With the purpose of transforming cooperatives to really serve the 
collective interests of farmers, after examining the pros and cons of different types, a three-stage 
model is proposed. In the first stage, company initiators are expected to enhance market 
competitiveness of the cooperative by leveraging on the company‟s resources and marketing 
expertise. In the second stage, leadership is expected to transfer from companies to rural elites who 
have high influence among farmers. Now that most rural elites have low education level and their 
vision tends to be constrained by their rural background, the author suggests that cooperatives 
should employ college graduate village officials who are educated and capable. After the 
transitional second stage, farmers will be able to capture leadership and make decisions to 
maximize their own needs in the last stage. The last stage is in line with the fundamental 
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cooperative principles of democratic control, serving the interests of farmers and fair distribution of 
profits.  
The three-stage process is intended to cultivate and empower farmers in a progressive 
manner so that the transformation can be carried out smoothly and effectively. However, it is not by 
any means the only solution to cooperative development in China where social, economic and 
natural conditions vary considerably from place to place. Decisions regarding the leadership and 
control issues in a cooperative should be made on the basis of actual situations, while in this 
process the three-stage proposal can be used as a reference. A cooperative can choose to start with 
the second stage or substitute leaders in a certain stage for another as needed, which does not 
necessarily have to follow the proposed sequence from the first to the last. Nevertheless, the kernel 
of the proposal that farmers cooperatives should be managed in a fair, transparent and democratic 
way for the common interest of all members is supposed to be universal to all solutions.  
Limitation of this thesis includes a lack of primary data because of the time constraint and 
the complexity to obtain good samples to represent cooperatives in the whole country. This paper 
and the three-stage proposal are results of analysis and deductions based on literatures and 
secondary data, therefore further research to support the proposal with quantitative evidence is 
needed. Furthermore, this thesis is limited to the Chinese agricultural industry that is not as 
advanced as agriculture in developed countries. Chinese farmers cooperatives, at the initial stage of 
development, are not able to compare with agricultural cooperatives in those countries that are large 
in scale, advanced in technology and professional in marketing. To compete on the global stage in 
the future, it is necessary to study advanced cooperative models as in Japan, North America, Europe, 
and Australia. Each of the regions has distinct cooperative business model that suits the particular 
socioeconomic situation of that region. While some cooperative models have greatly promoted 
agricultural development and farmers‟ welfare in the past, the changing global and regional 
environments of the agricultural industry demand a re-examination of the cooperative models to see 
if they are able to adapt to ecological and economic changes as well as the evolving demands of all 
stakeholders. In addition, the global requirements on freer trade, natural resource conservation and 
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environmental protection are setting new tasks for cooperative management and activities. To 
comply with these requirements, cooperatives need to transform their usual way of doing business. 
Hence, further research on the topic needs to be done to deal with the new business context and 
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2002 128,453 78,241 48,121.0 43.7% 2,475.6 3.1 45.8% 
2003 129,227 76,851 47,506.0 42.4% 2,622.2 3.2 45.6% 
2004 129,988 75,705 46,971.0 41.2% 2,936.4 3.2 47.6% 
2005 130,756 74,544 46,258.0 40.2% 3,254.9 3.2 45.2% 
2006 131,448 73,160 45,348.0 39.2% 3,587.0 3.3 42.4% 
2007 132,129 71,496 44,368.0 38.0% 4,140.4 3.3 42.2% 
2008 132,802 70,399 43,461.0 37.5% 4,760.6 3.3 40.9% 
2009 133,450 68,938 42,506.0 37.0% 5,153.2 3.3 38.6% 
2010 134,091 67,113 41,418.0 36.4% 5,919.0 3.2 37.7% 
2011 134,735 65,656 40,506.0 35.8% 6,977.3 3.1 36.1% 
2012 135,404 64,222 39,602.0 35.2% 7,916.6 3.1 34.4% 
2013 136,072 62,961 38,737.0 / 8,895.9 / / 
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